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Possible worlds models of belief have difficulties accounting for unaware-
ness, the inability to entertain (and hence believe) certain propositions.
Accommodating unawareness is important for adequately modelling epis-
temic states, and representing the informational content to which agents
have in principle access given their explicit beliefs. In this paper, I de-
velop a model of explicit belief, awareness, and informational content,
along with an sound and complete axiomatisation. I furthermore defend
the model against the seminal impossibility result of Dekel, Lipman and
Rustichini, according to which three intuitive conditions preclude non-
trivial unawareness on any possible worlds model of belief.
1. Introduction
Iggy is an agent, who may or may not be ideally rational. In his capacity as an
agent, Iggy must have at least some of what we’ll refer to broadly as epistemic
attitudes regarding some range of propositions. There will be some propositions
that Iggy knows, some he believes, some he disbelieves, and some that he’s
contemplated but he’s not sure about. Question: for any proposition ϕ, must
Iggy have some epistemic attitude or other regarding ϕ?
Most will want to say that he need not. To know, believe, be uncertain
about, or even suspend judgement regarding a proposition requires at least the
capacity to entertain that proposition, to represent it some way or another in
thought—and there may be some propositions that Iggy has never entertained,
will never entertain, and perhaps cannot even entertain.
For example, suppose that Iggy belongs to an isolated tribe located deep
in a far off jungle, which has had no contact with any other cultural group for
hundreds of years. Most people wouldn’t want to say that Iggy knows, believes,
or is uncertain about the proposition that we would ordinarily express were we
to utter the sentence ‘The habitat of the eastern grey kangaroo extends as far
north as the Cape York Peninsula’. It would furthermore be unnatural to say
that Iggy is agnostic, or has suspended judgement, on the matter of eastern grey
kangaroo habitats. Suspension of judgement is typically understood as a kind of
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mental act that one might perform upon entertaining some proposition, when
one decides that there’s insufficient reason to believe one way or the other. But
Iggy might not even know that there’s a proposition here for him to suspend
judgement about. Indeed, he may not have the basic mental resources necessary
to even think the thought, let alone decide whether he has sufficient evidence
to believe it.
So let us admit, at least in principle, that there may be some propositions of
which Iggy is unaware. I use this phrase semi-stipulatively: to be unaware of a
proposition ϕ is to lack the basic representational resources required to entertain
ϕ-thoughts or otherwise have what were above called epistemic attitudes with
ϕ as their content. To be aware of ϕ is to not be unaware of it.1
If this kind of unawareness exists, and is widespread, then it seems to be
the kind of thing to which any developed formal theory of the epistemic at-
titudes ought to pay attention. Consequently, after saying more in the next
section about what I mean by ‘awareness’ and why we should care about it,
in Section 3 I will characterise a class of models—Possible Worlds Awareness
(PWA) models—aimed at representing differences in states of awareness and
unawareness, and how these interact with the epistemic attitudes and questions
of information access. I focus on modelling the interaction of unawareness with
the attitudes of belief and knowledge, though much of my discussion will also be
of direct relevance to Bayesian models of uncertainty under unawareness (see,
e.g., Bradley (2017), Cozic (2016)).
As the name suggests, PWA models adopt the kind of coarse-grained ap-
proach to propositions that’s generally associated with possible worlds seman-
tics. The models are therefore subject to the influential triviality result of Dekel,
Lipman and Rustichini Dekel et al. (1998). In Section 4, I describe Dekel et al.’s
result and some natural extensions thereof, while in Sections 5–8, I critically
discuss the intuitions and implicit philosophical assumptions that motivate it.
As we will see, the force of their result depends much on the intended inter-
pretation of the model, and (moreover) on questions regarding the nature and
granularity of mental content.
2. Background
Before anything else, let me first say more about how ‘awareness’ is understood
in the wider literature and how I will be using the term (Section 2.1), and why
we should care about awareness so-understood (Section 2.2).
2.1 What is awareness?
In their seminal work on the topic, Fagin and Halpern Fagin and Halpern (1988)
were intentionally ambiguous with their use of ‘awareness’. For some of their
discussion, the term is used in connection with a notion of entertainability that’s
1 It is worth emphasising the distinction in English between being aware that something
is the case, and being aware of some thing. The former is synonymous with knowing a true
proposition: Iggy is aware that ϕ iff ϕ is true and Iggy knows it; Iggy is unaware that ϕ iff ϕ
is true and Iggy doesn’t know it. On the other hand, Iggy would be aware of a proposition in
something like the way he might be aware of an idea, an argument, or an oncoming train: by
consciously attending to (a representation of) the object of one’s awareness, or at least being
in a position to do so.
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at least similar to that which I characterised above. However, they also use it
to mark a distinction between the beliefs that a subject is consciously attending
to versus her background beliefs; and between those possibilities that the agent
has considered and incorporated into her deliberations versus those she’s not yet
considered or perhaps considered but forgotten about. And in still other cases,
Fagin and Halpern use ‘awareness’ and ‘unawareness’ to distinguish between
those conclusions which can and cannot be derived from a ‘database’ of stored
beliefs within a given amount of time.
In other words, we have had from the start four distinct (though by no
means unrelated) notions all being discussed under the same heading. Roughly,
we have awareness of ϕ as:
Entertainability: Being able to entertain the possibility that ϕ.
Attentional: Consciously attending to the possibility that ϕ.
Deliberative: Having considered the possibility that ϕ in one’s reasoning.
Derivability: Being able to derive that ϕ within a given time.
All four admit of differences in degree and further precisifications. For example,
some possibilities might be more or less at the forefront of Iggy’s conscious
attention, and some things might be more or less easy to derive, or derivable
only given certain conditions.
Unfortunately, matters have not in general become clearer since Fagin and
Halpern’s essay. Awareness is often characterised in the first instance as a “lack
of ability to conceive”, or a “lack of concept” (e.g., in Heifetz et al. (2008), Schip-
per (2014), and Walker (2014)), which perhaps suggests that something like the
entertainability sense is intended. Moreover, many of the formal conditions that
awareness is standardly taken to satisfy seem to fit best with something like the
entertainability sense, whereas they fit relatively poorly with the attentional,
deliberative, and derivability senses unless strong assumptions are made about
the capacities of the agent in question. (See, e.g., SYM, CONA, and especially
the AGPP principle; these will be discussed in Section 3.) However, charac-
terisations of ‘awareness’ in the literature tend to be perfunctory at best, and
detailed exposition on the matter is rare and sometimes conflicting, making
confident interpretation difficult.2
I note all this in order to draw attention to the fact that I will be under-
standing ‘awareness’ in this paper in a rather specific way—viz., as a particular
instance of the entertainability notion. This will be important throughout my
discussion, and I certainly do not want to claim that all of my conclusions apply
with equal force to every understanding of ‘awareness’ present in the literature.
Hence, it will be useful to get clearer on just what ‘awareness’ means in the
present context.
The following is a good rough-and-ready way to picture the kind of thing
that I have in mind. Suppose we adopt a very na¨ıve version of the Language of
Thought theory combined with the Representational Theory of Mind, at least
as applied to the epistemic attitudes (see Pitt (2018) for details). We assume
that for Iggy, and any agent like him, mental representation is underwritten by
2 For exceptions to this rule, see Fritz and Lederman (Fritz and Lederman) and Sillari
(2008a). An orthogonal distinction in kinds of awareness, between awareness that attaches to
propositions versus awareness that attaches to sentences or theorems, is also discussed in Fritz
and Lederman (Fritz and Lederman).
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an essentially linguistic system of meaningful symbols. Moreover, this symbolic
‘language’ looks a lot like a simplified version of English. Somewhere inside his
head Iggy has, or is capable of ‘uttering’, various word-like representations which
might denote individuals, properties, and relations, as well as perhaps opera-
tors, quantifiers, connectives, and so on. Call these his concepts. Iggy’s concepts
can be composed in a systematic way into sentence-like structures, which have
the propositional contents that they do as a consequence of the meanings of
their constituent concepts and the ways that those concepts are arranged. For
Iggy to have any epistemic attitudes whatsoever regarding a proposition ϕ, he
must be psychologically related to some sentence composed out of concepts he
possesses which means that ϕ (cf. Field (1978), Fodor (1975)). Presumably,
different agents will tend to have different concepts—different mental vocabu-
laries, as it were. Iggy lacks any concepts that pick out kangaroos, for example,
whereas the average Australian would typically possess such a concept. Call the
concepts that Iggy does have his basic representational resources.
If we were to accept all this, then we could say that Iggy is aware of ϕ,
in the sense that I have in mind, just in case he possesses concepts sufficient
to compose a sentence that means that ϕ. Thus, he need not be presently and
consciously attending to ϕ in order to be aware of it, and the entertaining
itself might require significant mental effort—in fact it may even be physically
impossible. So, for example, Iggy may be aware of the proposition expressed
by the near-infinitely long English sentence ‘Iggy believes that Jiggy believes
that Iggy believes that. . . that Jiggy believes that ϕ’, merely by being able to
represent himself, his colleague Jiggy, ϕ and the belief relation—even if actually
‘uttering’ the relevant sentence in his Language of Thought would require many
more neurons than could fit in any ordinary-sized human brain.
Now, I don’t myself attach much credence to that picture of how the mind
works. Even if mental representation is typically language-like in the way that
the picture supposes, it’s highly doubtful that the content of every epistemic
attitude that Iggy has will itself be the meaning of some sentence-like symbol
stored somewhere in his head (see esp. Cummins (1986), Cummins (1987)).
(Not that advocates of the Language of Thought and/or the Representational
Theory of Mind have ever thought otherwise—I called it “na¨ıve” for a reason.)
Furthermore, the picture gives the potentially misleading impression that the
possession of certain very basic logical concepts is a mere contingent matter,
a question of whether the agent has a particular word in their mental lexicon.
Had Iggy merely lacked the concepts for conjunction and negation, say, then
even if he could entertain ϕ and ψ individually, he might still have been unable
to entertain ¬ϕ and ϕ ∧ ψ.
Compare, for example, an account where the format of our mental repre-
sentations is more map-like in nature (cf. Camp (2007), Lewis (1994)). A map
that represents that Sydney is northeast of Melbourne and that Sydney is north-
east of Canberra automatically represents that Sydney is northeast of Melbourne
and Canberra, and it doesn’t need a special symbol denoting conjunction to do
so—the propositional contents of maps are closed under conjunctions just as
a consequence of the way that maps represent the world in general. Similarly,
a map-like representational system that can represent that Sydney is on the
coast is, by that very fact, able to represent that Sydney is not on the coast
(e.g., simply move whatever represents the city inland); and if ‘X’ marks the
spot where Blackbeard’s treasure is, then the absence of an ‘X’ marks the spots
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where it isn’t. Maps don’t usually have symbols on them that represent nega-
tion or absence, but they still manage to tell us a lot about what is and isn’t
the case without them. Hence, Iggy’s ability to entertain ¬ϕ and ϕ ∧ ψ might
be an immediate consequence of his ability to entertain ϕ and ψ, due to the
format that his mental representations take and the operation of the systems
that use them, rather than being dependent on the presence of some special
mental symbols that specifically denote logical operators and connectives. (I’ll
say more in relation to this in Section 3.1)
So the na¨ıve picture isn’t perfect, but it does manage to capture the core
idea of what I mean by ‘awareness’ well enough, and it does so in a relatively
intuitive way. In general: Iggy can represent different ways the world might
be. Presumably, his capacity to represent those different ways depends on his
having some stock of basic representational resources that can be systematically
restructured or recombined to represent new possibilities (as argued in Fodor
(1975), Fodor (1987)). This seems highly plausible regardless of the exact format
that our mental representations take, map-like or sentence-like or otherwise.
Some of those possibilities that Iggy has the basic resources to represent he
never will in fact represent, and some may be too complex or time-consuming
to actually represent given his limited cognitive resources—but there will still be
a good sense in which he possesses the basic representational resources required
to do so. On the other hand, some propositions Iggy will be unable to represent
by virtue of lacking the requisite representational resources; some distinctions
between ways the world might be won’t even be on Iggy’s mental radar. Of
these, he is unaware.
2.2 Why should we care about awareness?
I am inclined to think that all four senses of ‘awareness’ are important, each
in their own way and to varying extents. So why should we care about the
particular kind of awareness qua entertainability that I’ve specified?
Here’s one reason: it is the weakest of the four senses. One gets to be aware of
ϕ in the attentional, deliberative, or derivability senses only if one is aware of ϕ
in the entertainability sense. Moreover, awareness in any of the other three senses
will tend to vary dependent on the rational capacities of the agent in question.
To put the point roughly: amongst those propositions that Iggy can in principle
entertain, he will be able to consciously attend to more, incorporate more into
his reasoning, and derive more faster, the bigger and better his brain is. What
an agent can entertain in principle thus sets bounds on their awareness in the
other senses, bounds which depend only on that agent’s basic representational
resources (and not on their capacity for reasoning, attentional resources, etc.).
Furthermore, if unawareness in this sense is widespread,3 then it is an im-
portant phenomenon that ought to be represented in our best models of the
epistemic attitudes—including (but not limited to) our models of ideally ratio-
nal agents. Consider, for instance, the standard possible worlds models of belief
in the style of Hintikka Hintikka (1962). We begin with a rich space of possible
worlds, Ω, subsets of which represent the contents of our attitudes.4 Our agent
3 See Section 6 for discussion on how widespread we should expect ‘awareness’ to be.
4 By my use of ‘possible worlds,’ I mean to exclude specifically worlds which are either not
maximally specific, or inconsistent with classical propositional logic. Much of what I say will
not hang on any specific account of what ‘worlds’ are; though see Section 6 for discussion on
some issues that depend on exactly which worlds constitute Ω.
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Iggy (i) can then be associated with a binary relation Ri on Ω which for each
world ω (effectively) picks out a proposition Ri(ω) containing all and only those
worlds that Iggy considers possible at ω. We then say that Iggy believes that ϕ
at ω iff ϕ is true at every world in Ri(ω). Problem: if Ri(ω) is even the least
bit specific, then a vast number of things will be true at every world in Ri(ω),
and we can’t expect Iggy to believe all of them—and not just because he may
not be a very good deductive reasoner. Make Iggy as logically gifted as you like,
give him unlimited working memory, and all the time in the world; still, if he
can’t even entertain certain propositions then it’s wrong to say that he believes
them.
A simple example of what I mean. Suppose that there are only two atomic
propositions, ϕ and ψ, and exactly four possible worlds ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4 in Ω
corresponding to the different combinations of ϕ and ψ:
ϕ ∧ ψ ϕ ∧ ¬ψ
¬ϕ ∧ ψ ¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ
ω1 ω2
ω3 ω4
Suppose that Ri(ω1) = {ω1, ω2}. This is just the set of worlds where ϕ is true,
so we can say that Iggy believes ϕ. Now presumably, if Iggy believes ϕ then he
can entertain ϕ; and if he can entertain ϕ then he can distinguish between ϕ
and ¬ϕ. So it looks fair to say that Iggy is able to entertain ¬ϕ at ω1. Likewise,
since he can entertain ϕ and ¬ϕ, he can entertain ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ and ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ. The
latter is true at every world in Ri(ω1), and it’s reasonable enough to expect
that Iggy believes ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ. At the very least, he can certainly reason his way to
that conclusion given his other beliefs without much difficulty.
However, imagine that Iggy is wholly unaware of the ψ/¬ψ distinction. Per-
haps specifying the distinction requires some concept that Iggy lacks. Would we
be happy to say that Iggy believes ϕ ∨ ψ and ϕ ∨ ¬ψ at ω1? Both are true at
every world in Ri(ω1). But for Iggy to believe ϕ ∨ ψ or ϕ ∨ ¬ψ would require
him to make distinctions between possibilities which, ex hypothesi, he is unable
to entertain.
For the sake of clarification, it will be helpful to discuss two very common
responses to this kind of example before we move on.
1. First, you may have the thought that it would be equally wrong to say that
Iggy is able to entertain ψ∨¬ψ, even though ψ∨¬ψ picks out just the same set
of possible worlds that ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ does; thus the possible worlds model of content
is inadequate for understanding states of unawareness in any case.
If you do have that thought, then you will probably also think that possible
worlds theories of content suffer from problems relating to hyperintensionality
more generally. And you may well might be right. (I’ll consider this matter
again in Section 8.) But the phenomenon that I want to discuss in this paper is
very general, and arises regardless of how granular you think mental content is.
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Even if you accept a very coarse-grained conception of propositions—i.e., one
such that ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ and ψ ∨ ¬ψ are by virtue of their classical logical equivalence
the very same proposition just described or picked out in two different ways, or
under different modes of presentation—then you will still need to deal with the
possibility of unawareness. It’s not plausible to say that Iggy believes ϕ∨ψ under
any mode of presentation. (Henceforth, we’ll refer to advocates of coarse-grained
theories of content as possible worlds theorists.)
2. Second, you may think that the relational model has no real problems with
unawareness at all—at least, not once it’s interpreted in the right way. After
all, it is frequently said that the relational model is best viewed as a way of
representing an agent’s implicit rather than explicit beliefs, where the former
are understood to capture something like the informational content contained
in the beliefs that the agent actually has ‘stored’ somewhere in her head. Thus,
if we interpret the model this way, there need not be any issues whatsoever with
claiming that Iggy implicitly believes both ϕ ∨ ψ and ϕ ∨ ¬ψ, merely on the
basis of the assumption that he explicitly believes ϕ. After all, the former are in
a perfectly well-defined sense built into the informational content of the latter.
Now I want to be clear that I have no objections to interpreting the relational
model like this; if that’s the kind of thing you want to represent, then so be it.
Nevertheless, in response to the point I do want to introduce a distinction that
I think is very important when it comes to thinking about the informational
content of our epistemic attitudes, and one which underscores the need for
incorporating some representation of unawareness into our formal models.
Say that in a broad sense, the informational content of a set of (explicitly
represented, or ‘stored’) epistemic attitudes consists exactly in anything and
everything that’s entailed by the contents of those attitudes, whether separately
or in conjunction. It’s in this sense that it would be unproblematic to say that
Iggy’s explicit belief that ϕ “contains the information” that ϕ ∨ ψ and ϕ ∨ ¬ψ.
After all, the information is there, just waiting for someone with the appropriate
representational resources to draw it out.
But Iggy is not one of those with the required representational resources.
For him, some of that broad informational content is in a very strong sense
inaccessible: it is not available for him to use in reasoning, inference and decision
making (cf. Yalcin (2018)). For all rational purposes, that information is for him
completely invisible. Iggy may not even know that there’s a distinction that he’s
failed to consider, and no amount of reasoning with the distinctions that he does
have will lead him to recognise what he’s been missing. And information which
is wholly invisible to Iggy is, from his own perspective, not really information at
all. It seems clear then that there’s an important theoretical role for a second,
narrow notion of informational content—one that’s specifically dependent upon
awareness qua entertainability.
This point is, I think, especially straightforward if mental representation does
turn out to be sentence-like: obviously, and regardless of how rational he is, Iggy
cannot possibly derive from that which he explicitly believes any sentences the
content of which can only be expressed using concepts that he lacks. But the
distinction between broad and narrow informational content is still useful even if
mental representations are map-like. Imagine, for example, that Iggy and Jiggy
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each has their own ‘mental map’, Mi and Mj respectively, which have slightly











Though both maps explicitly represent that Australia is shaped like so, and
that Sydney is located on its southeast coast, Mj represents a somewhat more
specific possibility than Mi does: Mj explicitly represents that there are no
kangaroos to be found anywhere within or around the country; whereas Mi is
neutral on the matter of whether there are any kangaroos, and if so, where they
might be located. But, more importantly, given the richer key associated with
Mj , Jiggy could represent the presence of kangaroos at any number of different
locations, by simply adding a ‘k’ on the appropriate part of the map. Iggy’s
map, by contrast, lacks the resources to represent the presence or absence of
kangaroos—draw a ‘k’ on any part of Mi and you’re left with a meaningless
squiggle, or perhaps a very odd coastline, and in Iggy’s case the absence of a ‘k’
doesn’t represent anything at all.
So now consider:
ϕ = Sydney is on the southeast coast of Australia.
ψ = There are kangaroos as far north as the Cape York Peninsula.
The ‘explicit’ contents of both Iggy’s and Jiggy’s mental maps entail that ϕ∨ψ
and ϕ ∨ ¬ψ, since they both clearly represent at least ϕ. We can all agree that
ϕ∨ψ and ϕ∨¬ψ belong to the broad informational contents of both maps. But
Jiggy knows what it would take for ϕ ∨ ψ and ϕ ∨ ¬ψ to be true—he has the
capacity to represent all the different ways those propositions might be true,
he can imagine and entertain those possibilities and play around with them in
his hypothetical reasoning. Iggy, by contrast, cannot: his map entails ϕ∨ψ and
ϕ∨¬ψ, but he’s not aware of these entailments. The fact that Iggy’s mental map
includes ϕ ∨ ψ and ϕ ∨ ¬ψ in its broad informational content is of no rational
use to him even in principle, given his relatively limited conceptual resources.
So I take it that the distinction between broad and narrow informational
content is theoretically well-motivated, and independent of questions concern-
ing representational format. Furthermore, if we draw the natural corresponding
distinction between broad and narrow implicit beliefs, then it’s arguably the lat-
ter which fit better with the central function that the notion of ‘implicit beliefs’
were originally introduced to play—viz., as a way of marking a distinction be-
tween that information which is explicitly represented by a thinker versus that
which is not explicitly represented but is still accessible for use on the basis of
that which is.5
5 See Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (1996), pp. 185ff, for an illuminating discussion of
the notion of implicit belief in the context of sentence-like and map-like theories of mental
representation.
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But it doesn’t really matter what words we use. What’s important is whether
the distinctions are useful—and the fact that an agent’s narrow implicit beliefs
have much closer ties to matters concerning the agent’s rationality suggests that
they are. If Iggy fails to act appropriately given his narrow implicit beliefs then
he is rationally criticisable, at least to some (possibly very small) extent. On
the other hand, if Iggy fails to act appropriately given his non-narrow broad
implicit beliefs, then any such criticism seems wrong-headed. One isn’t the least
bit epistemically blameworthy for lacking certain representational resources, and
not having a way to mentally represent kangaroos doesn’t make Iggy irrational
under any remotely reasonable conception of rationality.
It’s worth noting also that given a narrow understanding of informational
content, there is still plenty of room for Stalnaker’s Stalnaker (1991) useful
distinction between content which is more or less accessible for different kinds
of applications. It’s plausible to think that the way we represent information
about the world makes a difference to how easily we might access it and reason
with it on a given occasion, and consequently that at any time we probably
only attend to a fragment of the total information we have represented across
the full range of our epistemic attitudes. As Stalnaker notes, recognising the
limits of attention and information access goes some of the way towards solving
the problems of logical omniscience that all possible worlds theories of content
have to deal with (cf. also Egan (2008), Lewis (1982), Stalnaker (1984), Yalcin
(2018)). But any such a solution cannot be complete without also recognising
the role that awareness qua entertainability has as a precondition for genuine
informational access simpliciter.
In summary: awareness qua entertainability is theoretically important, as are
the notions of narrow informational content and narrow implicit belief which
directly depend upon it. Hence, in the next section I aim to outline a class of
models that will distinguish appropriately between arbitrary agents’ (i) states
of awareness qua entertainability, (ii) their explicit knowledge and belief, and
(iii) the narrow informational content that’s in principle accessible given those
explicit attitudes, all within the context of a possible worlds theory of content.
Ultimately, it would be nice to have a model that incorporates all of the dif-
ferent kinds of unawareness—variabilities in attentional awareness, for example,
with perhaps a sliding scale for different degrees of informational accessibility
and deliberative capacity, and multiple belief states at once to represent frag-
mentation. It would in any case be useful to have some representation of (i) what
information an agent has access to in principle—what they could derive from
their explicit beliefs if they were ideally rational—from (ii) that information
that the agent does have access as a matter of fact, and (iii) that information
that’s readily available (or ready-to-degree-x available) to the agent given their
bounded capacities. Each notion has a role to play in explaining action, reason-
ing, and ideal versus bounded rationality. But that is much more than I can
hope for here, and an initial model for just one small part of that much larger
picture will have to suffice here.
3. Possible Worlds Awareness
To construct our model, we will first need a formal language. Given a finite set
of agents Ag = {1, . . . , n} and a countable set of atomic propositions Φ (with
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typical element p), we characterise LAXI(Φ) by the following grammar:
ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | Aiϕ | Xiϕ | Iiϕ,
where p ∈ Φ and i ∈ Ag. We abbreviate with ‘∨,’ ‘→,’ and ‘↔’ in the usual
ways, and we will let ‘>’ stand for p ∨ ¬p, and ‘⊥’ for p ∧ ¬p.
‘Aiϕ’ should be read as saying that i is aware of ϕ. (Henceforth I will
simply say ‘awareness’ rather than ‘awareness qua entertainability’.) I will leave
the interpretation of the X operators ambiguous for now, between an explicit
knowledge and an explicit belief reading. The I operators are used to stand for
either narrow implicit knowledge or narrow implicit belief, depending on how
we choose to read the Xs. To make things easier, I’ll focus just on the belief
interpretation for this section and the next. I will have more to say on the
different interpretations of X and I as we progress through later sections.
As noted, the usual way of generating a semantics for epistemic modals in-
volves assigning a relation Ri to each agent i which picks out those worlds i
considers possible at any given world ω. However, I will not assume that agents’
beliefs satisfy any closure conditions except closure under necessary equivalence
(which is essential to any possible worlds theory of content). Nor will I assume
that any given agent is irrational. I want the model to be flexible enough to
allow for both rationality and irrationality of explicit belief. Thus, in character-
ising agents’ explicit beliefs, I will use the strictly more general neighbourhood
structures of Montague (1970) and Scott (1970).
A standard neighbourhood model M consists in (i) a set of worlds Ω, (ii) a
set of what we will call belief functions Xi (one for each i ∈ Ag) which map each
world ω to a (potentially empty) set of (potentially empty) subsets of Ω, and
(iii) a propositional valuation function pi : Φ 7→ 2Ω. The satisfaction conditions
for ϕ in the sub-language LX(Φ) can then be given as follows:
M,ω |= p iff ω ∈ pi(p), for p ∈ Φ
M,ω |= ¬ϕ iff it’s not the case that M,ω |= ϕ
M,ω |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M,ω |= ϕ and M,ω |= ψ
M,ω |= Xiϕ iff {ω′ : M,ω′ |= ϕ} ∈ Xi(ω)
If we let ‘‖ϕ‖M ’ (the truth set of ϕ in M) refer to the set of worlds ω such that
M,ω |= ϕ, then the final clause can be stated a little more perspicuously as:
M,ω |= Xiϕ iff ‖ϕ‖M ∈ Xi(ω)
Thus, we can use belief functions to characterise directly those propositions
that we want to say i believes at a given world ω. Note that there is no inbuilt
assumption, for any particular ϕ and any ω, that ‖ϕ‖M must belong to Xi(ω).
Likewise, we don’t assume that if ‖ϕ‖M ∈ Xi and ψ is true at every world
in ‖ϕ‖M , then ‖ψ‖M ∈ Xi. Indeed, the logic associated with neighbourhood
models is very weak, consisting of just:
PROP. All classical propositional tautologies
MP. From ϕ and ϕ→ ψ, infer ψ
REP. From ϕ↔ ϕ′, infer ψ ↔ ψ[ϕ/ϕ′]
Where ‘ψ[ϕ/ϕ′]’ denotes any sentence that results from the replacement of zero
or more instances of ϕ in ψ with ϕ′. (For example, (Xi(p∨¬p))[p/q] can refer to
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Xi(p∨¬p), Xi(q∨¬p), Xi(p∨¬q), or Xi(q∨¬q).) Following Chellas (1980), we
will refer to any axiom system which contains PROP, MP, and REP as classical.
The flexibility afforded by neighbourhood structures will also be useful in
characterising states of awareness, which we will represent by an additional set
of awareness functions, Ai. Like the belief functions, every awareness function
is a mapping from worlds to sets of sets of worlds. However, in keeping with the
intended interpretation of the model, we will want to place a four additional
conditions upon each agent’s awareness function and its relationship with belief
functions. I’ll discuss these in turn.
3.1 Basic conditions on belief and awareness functions
pla. The most obvious condition concerns the relation between awareness and
the explicit attitudes. An agent’s awareness cannot float free of her explicit
beliefs: if she isn’t aware of a proposition, then she cannot explicitly believe
it. I take it that this is analytic of ‘awareness’ if anything is, given how I’ve
characterised the notion. For reasons that will become apparent below, in the
axiom system we’ll refer to this as PLAa:
PLAa. Xiϕ→ Aiϕ
We capture PLAa with the condition pla, that Xi(ω) ⊆ Ai(ω), for all ω.
sym. Next, and a little less obviously, I will assume that awareness is closed
under negations. So, if an agent is aware of ϕ, then she is aware of ¬ϕ. Hence,
SYM. Aiϕ→ Ai¬ϕ
We ensure that this axiom holds by assuming that Ai is closed under comple-
ments (sym). In any classical logic SYM implies Aiϕ↔ Ai¬ϕ.
I expect that SYM will be generally uncontroversial, and I have already
mentioned some reasons to think that our actual states of awareness might be
automatically closed under negations in Section 2.1. Nevertheless, allow me to
here add some considerations in favour of SYM.
First: on any account of concepts, one possesses the concept for some kind
F only if one is able to tell the Fs from the not-Fs. Concepts as they are widely
understood either literally are, or otherwise form the representational bases for,
our recognitional and sortal capacities; so, if you can think that a is an F you
can think that a is a not-F , which to the possible worlds theorist just is to think
that a is not an F . The same is plausibly true for propositions more generally.
One can’t really understand what it is for some possibility to be the case if one
can’t understand what it would take for it to not be the case. There is also a
long and widespread tradition going back to Wittgenstein (1922)—one that’s
particularly common amongst possible worlds theorists—according to which one
isn’t able to represent the possibility that ϕ without being able to represent ¬ϕ.
According to this tradition, to believe ϕ is just to carve the space of possibilities
Ω down the line that divides ϕ and ¬ϕ, and toss the ¬ϕ half away. So it’s at
least arguable, and quite widely assumed, that the capacity to believe anything
seems to presuppose ‘possession of the concept of negation’, in at least the weak
sense characterised by SYM.6
6 Something similar holds on almost every account of uncertainty within the Bayesian
tradition: having any uncertainty regarding ϕ implies having some uncertainty regarding ¬ϕ,
while learning ϕ requires setting one’s uncertainty regarding ¬ϕ to zero.
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con. We will also assume that awareness is closed under conjunctions: if an
agent is aware of ϕ and ψ, then she is aware of ϕ ∧ ψ.
CONA. (Aiϕ ∧Aiψ)→ Ai(ϕ ∧ ψ)
Thus we will assume that the Ai are closed under binary intersections (con). In
conjunction with SYM, this means that for all worlds ω and agents i, Ai(ω) is
either empty or a finitely additive Boolean algebra on Ω.
The reasons for accepting CONA are not dissimilar from those in favour of
SYM. Suppose that Iggy believes that ϕ, and believes that ψ. He may or may not
therefore believe that ϕ∧ψ, but there can be hardly any doubt that he is aware
of that possibility—in the sense that he has at least the basic representational
resources required to represent that proposition. Even if those beliefs are stored
in different ‘fragments’, there will be a good sense in which he could bring
those beliefs together, and guide his behaviour on the basis of the information
contained in the pair of them. As we’ve seen already, Iggy doesn’t have to have
a sentence in his head that specifically means ϕ ∧ ψ in order to represent that
proposition. It would be enough if he merely represents at once that the world
is as ϕ says it is and that the world is as ψ says it is, and is able to draw
conclusions as appropriate from that basis. This, I assume, is something that
anyone with the capacity to represent ϕ and ψ individually has the requisite
representational resources to do.
A clarificatory note: we will not be assuming that an awareness of ϕ ∧ ψ
implies an awareness of ϕ and awareness of ψ. In other words, we don’t assume:
DISA. Ai(ϕ ∧ ψ)→ (Aiϕ ∧Aiψ)
In any classical logic, having DISA alongside SYM and CONA would quickly
lead to triviality. As pointed out in Fritz and Lederman (Fritz and Lederman),
if an agent i is aware of any ϕ, then she’s aware of ϕ∧¬ϕ, and hence (by REP)
aware of ψ∧¬ψ for arbitrary ψ. Awareness of any ϕ would then imply awareness
of every ψ, which is clearly unacceptable. But the arguments just given in favour
of CONA don’t also support DISA, and more generally it should be apparent
that DISA is only plausible under the presupposition of a fine-grained theory
of content. (Consider again the example from Section 2.2: Iggy is aware of ϕ,
which just is (ϕ∨ψ)∧ (ϕ∨¬ψ), yet Iggy isn’t aware of either ϕ∨ψ or ϕ∨¬ψ.)
Obviously, this is only a reason to reject DISA if we have good reasons to accept
a coarse-grained conception of mental content—but that discussion will have to
wait until Section 8.
nax. Finally, and mostly for the sake of simplicity, I will make one further
assumption about the relationship between awareness and explicit belief:
NAX . Ai> → Xi>
In the context of the other axioms, this implies that if i is aware of anything at
all, then she is aware of >.
In context, then, NAX states that i has awareness only if she explicitly
believes >. Where REP has already been accepted, this is quite weak. It is hard
to imagine an agent worthy of the title who does not accept even the simplest
of tautologies, and the most popular theories of coarse-grained mental content
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imply that agents don’t even have a choice about whether to believe >. We
capture this in the model by use of the condition nax, that if Ω belongs to Ai,
then it belongs to Xi.
Building nax into the definition of a PWA model simplifies the relationship
between explicit and implicit attitudes by ruling out the possibility of awareness
without any explicit attitudes, without going so far as to commit us to the
more common (and stronger) axiom N (discussed in Section 4). If the reader is
unwilling to accept NAX , we can do without it by (i) removing condition nax
from Definition 3.1, and (ii) replacing the axiom NAX in Σ with the weaker
axiom Ai> → Ii>. The soundness and completeness proofs will be left mostly
unchanged.
3.2 PWA models
I will discuss further potential conditions on awareness and belief functions
below, but for now let us move on to the basic PWA models:
Definition 3.1 A model M = (Ω, {Xi}i∈Ag, {Ai}i∈Ag, pi) belongs to the class
of PWA modelsM iff:
1. Ω is a non-empty set
2. Xi and Ai are functions from Ω to 22Ω satisfying (for all ω ∈ Ω):
pla. P ∈ Xi(ω) only if P ∈ Ai(ω)
sym. P ∈ Ai(ω) only if Ω \ P ∈ Ai(ω)
con. P1 ∈ Ai(ω) and P2 ∈ Ai(ω) only if P1 ∩ P2 ∈ Ai(ω)
nax. Ω ∈ Ai(ω) only if Ω ∈ Xi(ω)
3. pi is a propositional valuation function
Definition 3.2 then characterises what it is for an element of LAXI(Φ) to be
true at a given world ω in a PWA model M (i.e., M,ω |= ϕ):
Definition 3.2 For all ϕ ∈ LAXI(Φ),
M,ω |= p iff ω ∈ pi(p), for p ∈ Φ
M,ω |= ¬ϕ iff it’s not the case that M,ω |= ϕ
M,ω |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M,ω |= ϕ and M,ω |= ψ
M,ω |= Xiϕ iff ‖ϕ‖M ∈ Xi(ω)
M,ω |= Aiϕ iff ‖ϕ‖M ∈ Ai(ω)
M,ω |= Iiϕ iff ‖ϕ‖M ∈ Ai(ω) and
⋂Xi(ω) ⊆ ‖ϕ‖M
Definition 3.2 should make it clear how the awareness functions work in
relation to the belief functions. If i believes each of a collection of propositions
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn which jointly imply ψ, then we will say that i (narrowly) implicitly
believes ψ whenever she’s aware of ψ. This is modelled by first characterising
(for each world ω) the largest set of worlds P1 ⊆ Ω consistent with all of i’s
explicit attitudes at ω as the intersection of all the sets of worlds in Xi(ω). We
then say that i implicitly believes any P2 such that P1 ⊆ P2 just in case i is
aware of P2. So, Iggy has the narrow implicit belief that ϕ just in case ϕ is
something Iggy can entertain that’s entailed by the conjunction of his explicit
beliefs. Thus, Ai acts as a filter or sieve over the propositions that i implicitly
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believes in the broad sense, letting through only those that i implicitly believes
in the narrow sense.
We say that ϕ is valid in M iff M,ω |= ϕ for every ω ∈ M ; and valid in
M (i.e.,M |= ϕ) iff ϕ is valid in every M ∈M. The classical logic associated
with the class of PWA models can then be axiomatised by the following system,
which we’ll label Σ:
PROP. All classical propositional tautologies
SYM. Aiϕ→ Ai¬ϕ
CONA. (Aiϕ ∧Aiψ)→ Ai(ϕ ∧ ψ)
XI. Xiϕ→ Iiϕ
IA. Iiϕ→ Aiϕ
KAI . (Iiϕ ∧ Ii(ϕ→ ψ))→ (Aiψ → Iiψ)
NAX . Ai> → Xi>
MP. From ϕ and ϕ→ ψ, infer ψ
REP. From ϕ↔ ϕ′, infer ψ ↔ ψ[ϕ/ϕ′]
Say that ϕ is a theorem of Σ (i.e., `Σ ϕ) just in case ϕ is either an axiom of Σ
or can be derived from the axioms by finite applications of the inference rules.
We can then show that ϕ is a theorem of Σ if and only if it is valid in the class
of PWA models:
Theorem 3.1 Σ is sound and complete with respect toM and LAXI(Φ); i.e.,
for all ϕ ∈ LAXI(Φ),M |= ϕ if and only if `Σ ϕ.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Σ is best understood as a logic for belief rather than knowledge, as it imposes
no requirement of veridicality on X (and I). Where a minimal conception of
knowledge takes it to be a species of veridical (or ‘non-delusional,’ ‘factive’)
belief, we would want our logic to include:
TI . Iiϕ→ ϕ
In combination with XI, this will get us:
TX . Xiϕ→ ϕ
We can ensure TI and TX by adding a reflexivity condition of the form:
tx. If P ∈ Xi(ω), then ω ∈ P
Since, under condition tx, Xiϕ is true only at worlds where ϕ is true, and Iiϕ is
only true at worlds ω where Aiϕ and
⋂Xi(ω) ⊆ ‖ϕ‖M , the addition of tx will
also get us that Iiϕ is true at ω only if ϕ is too (since ω ∈
⋂Xi(ω)).
Finally, it’s worth noting that if we wanted to capture instead the other
senses of ‘awareness’ outlined in Section 2.1, we might be able to do this by
removing pla, sym and/or con from Definition 3.1 and modifying the axiom
system appropriately. For example, I see no strong reasons to think that PLAa
and CONA are appropriate for either the attentional or deliberative senses of
‘awareness’, unless we make very strong idealising assumptions about the agent’s
capacities.
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3.3 Relationship to other models
Before I discuss Dekel et al.’s triviality result and my response to it, in this
subsection I’ll briefly discuss the relationship between PWA models and other
models in the literature. It should be emphasised that the notions of ‘awareness’
and ‘implicit belief’ referred to in the other works discussed herein need not be
the specific kinds of awareness and implicit belief that I take to be represented
by PWA models, though they are of course clearly related.
Considered primarily as a way of representing the relationship between im-
plicit belief and explicit belief (i.e., ignoring the awareness operator), PWA
models resemble the local reasoning structures of Fagin and Halpern (Fagin and
Halpern 1988, pp. 58ff), which are intended to represent a ‘fragmented’ belief sys-
tem. Indeed, PWA models are essentially generalised local reasoning structures
with the addition of awareness functions acting as sieves over the supersets of⋂Xi(ω). In the same vein, PWA models are also quite similar to the more recent
model of implicit and explicit belief developed by Velazquez-Quesada Vela´zquez-
Quesada (Vela´zquez-Quesada). Velazquez-Quesada’s construction works by tak-
ing a neighbourhood function Xi defined for a finite space Ω (interpreted as
specifying i’s explicit beliefs), and using it to systematically construct another
function X ?i which contains Ω and is closed under supersets and binary in-
tersections, interpreted as specifying i’s implicit beliefs. In outline, this con-
struction of X ?i is quite similar to my construction of ‖Iiϕ‖M as a subset of
{ω : ⋂Xi(ω) ⊆ ‖ϕ‖M}, though there are some important differences. One of
these concerns the axiom XI, which is not valid on Velazquez-Quesada’s class of
models. Velazquez-Quesada provides an interesting defence of this characteris-
tic of his model. For present purposes, however, XI seems essential inasmuch as
I is understood to represent the informational content contained in an agent’s
explicit beliefs—every explicit belief that ϕ contains at least the information
that ϕ, after all.
In terms of the relationship between implicit belief and awareness, the use
of the Ai functions in PWA models is conceptually similar to the way that
awareness functions are used in the Kripke structures for general awareness of
Fagin and Halpern Fagin and Halpern (1988). Fagin and Halpern’s models use
awareness functions that take sets of sentences as values rather than sets of
(possible-worlds) propositions, where those sets of sentences need not be closed
under logical equivalence; by virtue of this, they are able to generate extremely
fine-grained distinctions between states of awareness. No particular restrictions
are placed on Fagin and Halpern’s awareness functions, and they define agents’
explicit beliefs as a subset of their implicit beliefs—specifically, those the content
of which they are aware.
PWA models also share many similarities with the partitional models of Fritz
and Lederman Fritz and Lederman (Fritz and Lederman). (Especially given
the presence of sym and con and with pla dropped and stronger rationality
conditions placed on the Xi functions.) Their models are intended to capture
a somewhat stronger logic of belief (and knowledge) and its interaction with
awareness also within the context of a coarse-grained approach to modelling
content. Like Fagin and Halpern, Fritz and Lederman take a notion of implicit
belief as a primitive and define explicit beliefs as those states of implicit belief
the content of which the agent is aware.
PWA models have much in common with Yalcin’s resolution-sensitive mod-
els of belief Yalcin (2018). Yalcin uses a partition over logical space to represent
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different ‘resolutions’ at which a non-ideal agent might conceive of a space of
possibilities. That partition acts to filter between accessible and inaccessible
possible-worlds propositions in essentially the same way that the Ai functions
do, or in much the same way that a Boolean sub-algebra of 2Ω might be used
on a probabilistic model of uncertainty to represent the idea that an agent need
not have degrees of belief regarding propositions at all levels of specificity. Yal-
cin is primarily concerned with representing limited informational accessibility
under a holistic model of belief for non-ideal agents, where the inaccessibility
might result from multiple sources including, for example, attentional or com-
putational limitations, rather than merely conceptual limitations. Many of the
motivations for Yalcin’s resolution-sensitive models clearly overlap with those
for PWA models, and the former are in effect what PWA models would be if
nax were removed and the Xi functions could only ever take singleton sets of
propositions as values.
So much for similarities; now let us consider perhaps the main respect in
which PWA models differ from a great many alternative models of awareness in
the literature. In particular, it is not only common for models of awareness to
satisfy at least the axiom DISA mentioned earlier, but also more generally the
property of Awareness Generated by Primitive Propositions (AGPP); i.e., that
i is aware of every primitive proposition in Ψ ⊆ Φ if and only if she is aware of
every ϕ ∈ LAXI(Ψ). (See, for example, Cozic (2016), Halpern (2001), Heifetz
et al. (2006), Li (2009), and Schipper (2015).) AGPP immediately implies DISA,
and just like DISA it is quite obviously not going to play nicely with any remotely
coarse-grained theory of content.
Given what I’m trying to model, however, AGPP seems highly implausible.
According to AGPP, for Iggy to be aware of, say, Ajp, he need only be aware
of the primitive proposition p. But that cannot be right: he also needs to be
aware of the other agent j, and the relation of awareness. (Proviso: I am as-
suming that Ajp is contingent. See Section 6 for discussion.) This suggests two
independent problems that we might raise against the principle. First, there are
no compelling reasons to think that Iggy must able to represent any agent in
Ag as an automatic consequence of being able to represent anything at all. Iggy
may not even be able to represent himself, let alone another agent who he may
never have been in any kind of contact with—or who may not even actually ex-
ist. Second, Iggy’s capacity to entertain p-thoughts doesn’t automatically come
with the capacity to represent that some agent or other is awareness-related to
p, in the specific way that I defined ‘awareness’ in Section 2.1. (A lot of con-
cepts went into my characterisation of that notion, so an inability to represent
the relation of awareness wouldn’t be at all surprising!) The same, of course,
goes for narrow implicit belief relation, and even belief and knowledge. It’s not
a precondition of agenthood that agents in general should necessarily have the
resources to represent those specific kinds of propositional attitude relations.7
One can readily imagine a member of an alien species, say, or an animal with a
less developed theory of mind than our own, who lacks any notion of our spe-
7 Introspection principles—e.g., Xiϕ→ XiXiϕ and ¬Xiϕ→ Xi¬Xiϕ—would imply that
knowledge/belief in any proposition requires higher-order knowledge/belief, and hence aware-
ness, in one’s own first-order knowledge/belief states. But these are dubious axioms even
for normative logics of knowledge/belief under the assumption of full awareness Williamson
(2002); they’re even less plausible for a descriptively-oriented logic of knowledge/belief that
incorporates unawareness such as the one I’m aiming to construct.
16
cific folk-psychological attitudes and yet can still be said to have such attitudes
themselves.
Consequently, AGPP is too strong as a general principle for modelling aware-
ness as I’m understanding it. Likewise, and for the reasons just noted, we will
also want to reject each of the following consequences of AGPP:
AIA. Aiϕ→ AiAjϕ
AIX . Aiϕ→ AiXjϕ
AII . Aiϕ→ AiIjϕ
By contrast, SYM and CONA (in conjunction with PLAa) are only strong
enough to get us the result that if an agent i is aware of every ϕ in a set
X ⊆ LAXI(Φ), then i will also be aware of everything in the closure of X under
¬ and ∧.
4. The Impossibility of Unawareness
In this section, I outline a lightly modified version of Dekel et al.’s well-known
impossibility result. It centres on three straightforward assumptions about the
relationship between awareness and the epistemic attitudes:
PLA. ¬Aiϕ→ (¬Xiϕ ∧ ¬Xi¬Xiϕ)
AUR. Ai¬Aiϕ→ Aiϕ
XUI. ¬Xi¬Aiϕ
Dekel et al. themselves describe PLA (for ‘Plausibility’) as the most plausi-
ble of their three axioms (hence the name), and many in the literature have
followed them in treating it as fundamental—or even definitional—for any ad-
equate understanding of awareness. See, for instance, Chen et al. (2012), Cozic
(2016), Heifetz et al. (2006), Modica and Rustichini (1994), Modica and Rusti-
chini (1999), Walker (2014), though cf. Halpern (2001), where PLA is derivable
only under certain assumptions.
Given a classical logic, PLA is of course just the conjunction of PLAa with:
PLAb. ¬Aiϕ→ ¬Xi¬Xiϕ
PLAb says that if an agent i is unaware of ϕ, then she cannot believe that
she doesn’t believe ϕ. AUR (for ‘AU Reflection’) says that if i is aware of
the proposition ¬Aiϕ, then she is ipso facto aware of ϕ itself. The intuitions
motivating PLAb and AUR are the same, and is easiest to grasp if we view
awareness and belief as relations that hold between a thinking subject and those
propositions she entertains—the intended idea being that anyone who can think
that a is not R-related to b has the conceptual resources to think in terms of a,
R, and b. Thus, for PLAb: if i can believe that she’s not belief-related to ϕ, the
she can think in terms of ϕ directly. Likewise, for AUR: if i can entertain the
idea that she is not awareness-related to ϕ, then she can entertain ϕ directly.
Finally, XUI (for ‘XU Introspection’) says it’s impossible for i to believe that
she is unaware of some specific proposition ϕ. To be clear: i might be aware that
there exists some propositions she’s not aware of, and which some other agent
may be aware of. All of the axioms we discuss in this paper are consistent
with saying this much. But i cannot be aware of a specific state of unawareness
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that she has, towards a particular proposition ϕ. To express the existentially
quantified thoughts, we would need more than the non-quantificational language
that I’m employing here.8
In Sections 5–7, we will examine the plausibility of these axioms in more
detail; for now, let us focus on the impossibility result:
Theorem 4.1 Suppose Σ∗ is a classical logic which includes PLA, AUR, and
XUI. Then, if Σ∗ includes N, then for every ϕ, `Σ∗ Aiϕ; and if Σ∗ includes
MON, then for all ϕ and ψ, `Σ∗ ¬Aiϕ→ ¬Xiψ.
Where:
N. Xi>
MON. From ϕ→ ψ, infer Xiϕ→ Xiψ
Proof. From AUR, PLAb: ¬Aiϕ → ¬Ai¬Aiϕ and ¬Ai¬Aiϕ → ¬Xi¬Xi¬Aiϕ.
With XUI and REP, this gets us ¬Aiϕ→ ¬Xi>. So, ¬Aiϕ is inconsistent with
N. Furthermore, MON implies that for any ψ, Xiψ → Xi>; or equivalently,
¬Xi> → ¬Xiψ. So, ¬Aiϕ→ ¬Xiψ.
Thus, for any classical logic Σ∗, the very presence of a non-trivial Ai operator
is incompatible with PLA, AUR, XUI, and at least one of N or MON. Moreover,
neither N nor MON (nor PLAa, for that matter) are essential to generating a
serious problem, as the following corollary indicates:
Corollary 1 Suppose Σ∗ is a classical logic which includes PLAb, AUR, and
XUI. Then, for all ϕ, `Σ∗ ¬Aiϕ→ ¬Xi>.
And this is already a very troubling result—unawareness shouldn’t preclude
belief in simple propositional tautologies!
We can generalise the badness a little further, by noting that XUI can be
broken down into two separate axioms:
XUIa. ¬Aiϕ→ ¬Xi¬Aiϕ
XUIb. Aiϕ→ ¬Xi¬Aiϕ
XUIa is a simple consequence of AUR and PLAa, so what XUI actually brings
to the table is better understood through XUIb. Hence,
Corollary 2 Suppose Σ∗ is a classical logic which includes PLAa, PLAb, AUR,
and XUIb. Then, for all ϕ, `Σ∗ ¬Aiϕ→ ¬Xi>.
What’s worse, if we add SYM, CONA, and NAX back into the mix, then we
again get that if i is unaware of anything, then she’s unaware of everything:
Corollary 3 Suppose Σ∗ is a classical logic which includes PLAa, PLAb, AUR,
XUIb, SYM, CONA, and NAX . Then, for all ϕ and ψ, `Σ∗ ¬Aiϕ→ ¬Aiψ.
8 Given the straightforward nature of PWA models, I would not anticipate any difficulties
in extending them to allow for quantification over propositional variables. I have not done this
since the issues relevant to the present paper arise already with non-quantificational languages.
For relevant work, see esp. Fritz and Lederman (Fritz and Lederman), as well as Halpern and
Reˆgo (2009), Sillari (2008b), and Walker (2014).
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Proof. From Corollary 2, ¬Aiϕ → ¬Xi>, and from NAX , ¬Xi> → ¬Ai>.
We’ve seen that in any classical logic with PLAa, SYM, and CONA, Aiϕ implies
Ai(ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ), and hence Ai>. So, ¬Ai> → ¬Aiψ; and for all ϕ and ψ, ¬Aiϕ→
¬Aiψ.
Since PLAa is secure if anything is, if we want non-trivial awareness then
we have a choice:
1. Reject classical logic, and/or
2. Reject at least one of XUIb, AUR, or PLAb.
In the following three sections, I will discuss (in turn) XUIb, AUR, and PLAb.
Overall, I will argue that the possible worlds theorist is entitled to reject at
least one of XUIb, AUR, or PLAb, and perhaps all three. However, matters
are complicated: which of those three axioms we ought to reject in particular
will depend partly on (i) how we want to interpret X, (ii) the specific coarse-
grained theory of content that we want to adopt, and (iii) whether there exist
any necessarily unentertainable propositions.
5. Critical Discussion: XUIb
Assume first that we want X to specifically represent knowledge, or indeed
any other veridical epistemic attitude. (For example, it’s plausible that rational
certainty is veridical: correctly updating on one’s evidence should never lead one
to become immutably convinced of a falsehood.) Since XUIb follows immediately
from TX , and TX just is the veridicality axiom, there is no plausible way out
of the triviality result via XUIb under such an interpretation.
On the other hand, assume that we want X to represent belief. Under this
interpretation, XUIb says that if i is aware of ϕ, then she does not explicitly
believe that she’s not aware of ϕ. And this does not seem especially plausible.9
It would be odd, perhaps, for Iggy to have false beliefs about his own state
of awareness. After all, if Iggy is aware of ϕ, then you might think that he has
access evidence justifying the belief that he’s aware of ϕ—at least where ϕ is
a proposition that Iggy can actually entertain. (Recall from Section 2.1 that
entertainability in principle doesn’t mean entertainability in practice, and Iggy
can of course only believe what he can in fact entertain.) But XUIb says that
Iggy cannot falsely believe that he is in some state of unawareness. And even if
he does have evidence that he’s aware of ϕ, he might have even more evidence
that he’s not aware of ϕ. Or perhaps he has evidence that he’s aware of ϕ, but he
doesn’t weigh up that evidence appropriately. As a non-ideal agent, then, Iggy
can presumably have all sorts of absurd and unjustified beliefs that fly in the
face of his evidence. Why should his beliefs about awareness be any different?
Consider, for instance, the following case:
9 It’s worth noting that, although Dekel et al. express their result only in terms of ‘knowl-
edge,’ they don’t presuppose that TX is valid in general, and (more importantly) the result
has been widely taken to apply to all epistemic models which use Aumann structures or some-
thing closely analogous, including those intended to represent non-veridical states. See, e.g.,
(Cozic 2016, p. 3), Schipper (2013), (Sillari 2008b, p. 516) and the models outlined in Schipper
(2015).
19
Example 1. After long discussions on the matter with leading philoso-
phers and psychologists, Iggy ends up committed to an error theory
about folk psychology. According to this theory, all talk of being
‘aware of,’ ‘entertaining,’ or even ‘believing’ abstract entities like
propositions is bunk, a manner of thinking associated with an out-
dated and generally inaccurate theory of how our minds work.10 Iggy
has thought a lot about folk psychology and about his stance on it,
so he’s clearly aware of the proposition Iggy does not believe that folk
psychology is an accurate theory. However, he doesn’t believe that
he’s aware of that proposition—in fact, he strongly (and wrongly)
believes that he isn’t.
Let ϕ be the proposition that Iggy does not believe that folk psychology is an
accurate theory. We might view this as a case where Iggy has overwhelming
evidence that ¬Aiϕ, or one where he has insufficient evidence that ¬Aiϕ but
believes it anyway. Either way, we have a plausible situation where Aiϕ∧Xi¬Aiϕ
is true, and thus a counterexample to XUIb.
So, here is our first lesson: while XUIb is clearly unavoidable if our goal is to
model a veridical attitude like knowledge, it does not look like we should want
to keep it around if our goal is to model non-veridical belief. Note that the point
being made here is entirely independent of how fine-grained or coarse-grained
we take mental contents to be. XUIb is dubious for non-veridical belief given any
position on the granularity of mental content, and should therefore be dropped
regardless of whether we want to stick with a classical logic or not.
6. Critical Discussion: AUR
Since AUR doesn’t interact in any interesting way with TX , we can consider
its plausibility independently of how we interpret the X and I operators. Nev-
ertheless, AUR turns out to be much trickier than XUIb to evaluate, and doing
so will involve opening more than one can of worms. The large number of issues
here necessitates some brevity, and I will not pretend to have stated the last
word on any of them.
It’s unsurprising that AUR is plausible given a fine-grained theory of content,
so the point of the present section is only to consider whether and to what extent
AUR can also be considered plausible from the perspective of a coarse-grained
theory of content. That is, the question I’ll be considering is: supposing we’ve
already accepted a coarse-grained theory of content, should we also accept AUR?
By the end of the section I will conclude that (i) counterexamples to AUR seem
to exist on a ‘metaphysical’ conception of coarse-grained content, while (ii) on an
alternative ‘epistemic’ conception of coarse-grained content, AUR is defensible.
6.1 Metaphysical conceptions of coarse-grained content
Let’s begin with what we can call the metaphysical conception of coarse-grained
content, according to which if ϕ↔ ψ holds as a matter of metaphysical necessity,
10 An error theorist about a domain of discourse holds that at least all positive, first-order,
atomic and non-trivial or non-analytic sentences in the domain are meaningful (truth-apt),
yet systematically false. An error theorist about folk psychology would deny the truth of any
sentence of the form Aiϕ, Xiϕ, or Iiϕ, but may accept the truth of, e.g., ¬Aiϕ, Aiϕ→ Aiϕ, or
Aiϕ∨ψ (i.e., if ψ is true). In LAXI(Φ), Aiϕ, Xiϕ, or Iiϕ are not ‘atomic,’ but each corresponds
to an atomic sentence in the ordinary languages where folk psychological discourse usually
occurs.
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then ϕ and ψ denote one and the same content. Ω on this picture can be thought
of as the space of metaphysical possibilities, such that to be aware of (or believe
that) Water is H2O is just to be aware of (or believe that) H2O is H2O. I suspect
that most readers, when they think of a coarse-grained theory of content, will
have this kind of conception in mind; it is the kind of account most typically
(but not necessarily) associated with externalism about content.11
On the metaphysical conception, counterexamples to AUR will take the form
of a proposition ψ such that ¬Aiϕ↔ ψ is metaphysically necessary, but Aiψ →
Aiϕ is not. Such counterexamples can exist only where the ψ in question is
either metaphysically contingent or impossible: if ψ and ψ ↔ Aiϕ are both
metaphysically necessary, then so is Ai¬Aiϕ → Aiϕ. I will discuss whether
there are any necessarily unentertainable propositions separately (Section 6.2),
so here we will focus only on those cases where the ψ in question is contingent.
Prima facie, counterexamples of this form should be easy to find: for any
given proposition ψ, there will usually be many ways—different modes of presentation—
under which a different agents might entertain something metaphysically equiv-
alent to ψ despite having very different conceptual resources. I think that the
relevant counterexamples probably do exist. But their existence is not quite as
easy to establish as first appearances suggest.
Consider the following case:
Example 2. Iggy has just made first contact with an alien from the
planet Gzorp, with whom he’s attempting to communicate. Gzorp
is 65.24 light years away from Earth, bearing 92.45° at an elevation
of 30.13°. In its own language, the Gzorpian asserts that Iggy is not
aware of the proposition that skirnobs are poisonous, where a skirnob
is a kind of Gzorpian fruit found all over the planet. Iggy does not
understand, of course, but he knows that the Gzorpian just asserted
something, and that whatever it is, it’s true.
Let ϕ denote the proposition skirnobs are poisonous, and let ψ pick out that
set of worlds where the proposition the Gzorpian actually just expressed is true.
Then it’s presumably the case that Aiψ, and ψ ↔ ¬Aiϕ. If it’s also the case
that ¬Aiϕ, then we have a counterexample to AUR.
However, for the case to work, it needs to be true that Iggy has no way
of entertaining the thought that skirnobs are poisonous under any mode of
presentation whatsoever. So, for instance, we must suppose that he doesn’t
have the resources to think anything from the following (non-exhaustive) list:
1. The kind of fruit the Gzorpian just referred to is poisonous.
2. The kind of fruit with purple stripes and pink feathers is poisonous.
3. The kind of fruit, an instance of which is 65.24 light years away from me
bearing 92.45° at an elevation of 30.13°, is poisonous.
4. The kinds of things referred to by the sound /sk@:n6b/ in the language of
those things are poisonous.
5. The kinds of things in the category my community refers to when they
make the sound /fru:t/, an instance of which is 6.17218×1017 metres away
from me bearing 92.45° at an elevation of 30.13°, are poisonous.
11 Thanks to [anonymised] for highlighting to me the importance of discussing AUR under
the metaphysical conception, and for discussion on these issues more generally. I owe Examples
3 and 4 below to him.
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Generally: give Iggy some basic sortal concepts and a way to represent arbi-
trary relative distances, directions, and times, and there won’t be many objects
that actually exist/existed/will exist, or properties that are/were/will be in-
stantiated, that Iggy won’t in principle have the resources to think about under
some mode of presentation or other (cf. Hofweber (2016)). He almost certainly
never will have all these thoughts, but he could—and that’s all that’s required
for awareness. So, perhaps Iggy could be aware of the proposition Iggy is not
aware of the proposition that skirnobs are poisonous without being aware of
skirnobs are poisonous, but this would require that he’s quite representationally
impoverished indeed.
I suspect that it is possible for agents to be impoverished in this way, but
we couldn’t expect it of any (or many) actual human beings. Thus, while we
have here a potential counterexample to AUR, the case also points to a kind of
practical triviality for the notion of awareness under this conception of coarse-
grained content. That is, awareness can come very cheap on the metaphysical
conception, and this cheapness serves to undermine the theoretical importance
of the notion. Even deep in the jungle, Iggy could still think a thought with
the same content as that which we would ordinarily express upon uttering ‘The
habitat of the eastern grey kangaroo extends as far north as the Cape York
Peninsula’; in fact there’s dozens of obvious and easy ways by which he could
do this, though Iggy himself wouldn’t recognise them as such.
The problem, of course, is that the flexibility in constructing alternative
modes of presentation by which one might entertain Aiϕ will tend to go hand-
in-hand with the same degree of flexibility in constructing alternative modes
of presentation for entertaining ϕ itself. It’s easy to imagine various ways of
describing the set of metaphysically possible worlds where Aiϕ is true that don’t
specifically mention ϕ; what’s a lot less easy is to imagine an agent with the
capacity to entertain the former without also having any capacity to entertain
something metaphysically equivalent to the latter.
One more example to drive the point home:
Example 3. As it turns out, the state of being aware of the proposi-
tion that skirnobs are poisonous can be necessarily identified with a
particular psychophysical state, S. Iggy is a brilliant neuroscientist,
and can represent himself as being in state S.
This time, letting ψ denote that set of worlds where Iggy is in state S, ψ ↔ Aiϕ
is necessary. And since Aiψ, so we also have Ai¬ψ. But do we have Aiϕ? This
would be easier to argue for if we were internalists about content. In that case
S could be identified with some internal (presumably neurological) state, and
it’s quite plausible that Iggy could represent an arbitrary neurological state
without being able to represent that skirnobs are poisonous. (Merely looking at
a brain in that state and thinking inside my head is like that would suffice.) But
internalism sits poorly with the metaphysical conception, and few adherents to
the latter would want to commit themselves to the former. Externalists will have
a much tougher time of showing that Aiϕ holds in this example. After all, on an
externalist’s theory, S would presumably be a highly disjunctive psychophysical
state, where at least some of the disjuncts would involve causal connections
between the agent and skirnobs. And being able to represent that kind of state
without being able to represent skirnobs in one way or another is not obviously
possible.
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There are additional examples we could consider, involving for example
Burgean social externalism and the apparent capacity to entertain a thought
about arthritis without really knowing what that is merely by being situated in
the relevant linguistic community. I will not try to consider them all. What is
clear is that there is an argument—or rather, several arguments—to be made
for the existence of counterexamples to AUR under the metaphysical conception
of coarse-grained content. With that said, there is also a genuine concern that
awareness is a little too cheap on the metaphysical conception, at least for ordi-
nary agents whom we can expect to have reasonably rich basic representational
resources.
6.2 Necessarily unentertainable propositions
Perhaps there is an easier route to finding counterexamples to AUR: if, for some
agent i, there are any propositions ϕ of which i is necessarily unaware, then ¬Aiϕ
is necessary, and there will be (vastly many) ways that i might entertain ¬Aiϕ
without entertaining ϕ. (For example, i could entertain ¬Aiϕ by entertaining
ψ ∨ ¬ψ, for any ψ that i can in fact entertain.) But are there any propositions
ϕ and agents i such that it’s metaphysically impossible that i lacks the basic
representational resources to entertain ϕ? It’s not obvious that there are.12
Let me consider two general kinds of argument for necessarily unentertainable
propositions.
First, you might think that some propositions cannot be entertained by be-
ings us as a result of our cognitive limitations. For instance, due to limited
resources of memory and processing, there may be some ϕ which are simply too
complex or specific for an ordinary agent like Iggy to entertain. Of course, limi-
tations of memory or processing are insufficient to make the point: these limita-
tions are contingent, and there are no good reasons to suspect that there aren’t
any possible worlds where they have been overcome (including, potentially, in
our own future). And as we’ve already discussed, the notion of awareness that
we’re playing with here isn’t bound by the contingent limitations of the ordinary
human brain (Section 2.1). But there are other examples in the vicinity that
might deserve some more weight. In particular, you might think that there are
hard-wired limitations on the kinds of phenomenological experiences we might
undergo (Nagel 1986, pp. 90ff). Given the kind of being that Iggy is, perhaps
he cannot—as a matter of metaphysical necessity—know what it is like to be a
bat. Now, if (i) it is metaphysically necessary of Iggy that he is a human, (ii)
it is metaphysically essential to being human that one’s brain is hard-wired in
this kind of way (i.e., such as to preclude the possibility of undergoing certain
kinds of experiences), and (iii) ‘what it is like to be a bat’ can be cashed out in
terms of some propositional content (or contents), then we might have a coun-
terexample to AUR here. I will leave this matter hanging, though it should go
without saying that not one of (i)–(iii) is unassailable.
12 For a recent and thorough treatment of several arguments relating to the present dis-
cussion, see Hofweber (2016). It’s important to note, however, that Hofweber’s discussion is
centred on the issue of whether there are any aspects of reality which cannot be expressed
in language or thought by beings like us—i.e., whether we might express or entertain every
proposition given the way we actually are. His concern is not directly on whether there exists
any propositions that are necessarily unentertainable tout court, or necessarily unentertainable
for some agent i.
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The second kind of argument purports to establish that there aren’t enough
entertainable propositions to go around. Perhaps the best known of these can
be found in Lewis (Lewis 1986, pp. 104–7), as part of his response to the Russell-
Kaplan paradox (cf. Davies (1981), Kaplan (1995)). Lewis gives three reasons
for thinking that there are unentertainable propositions. The first is that it
provides a way out of the paradox, though few commentators have been con-
vinced by this—at most it helps with a very specific version of the paradox, but
doesn’t address the deeper problem (e.g., Bueno et al. (2014), Chalmers (2011),
Uzquiano (2015)). The second reason rests heavily on the specifics of Lewis’
views on mental content and the role that relative naturalness plays within it.
I’ll describe this briefly below, but a full discussion would take us too far afield.
The third and final reason arises from Lewis’ functionalism more generally, and
it’s this reason that we’ll focus on here.
As Lewis points out, if one accepts a certain kind of functionalism about
what it is to believe (or desire, be uncertain about, etc.) a proposition—I’ll say
more about the functionalist assumptions in a moment—then there can be no
more states of believing (or desiring, being uncertain about, etc.) a proposition ϕ
than there are functional roles with which to define those states. However, while
there are probably at least i3 sets of possible worlds, Lewis also asserts that
there are probably no more than countably many functional roles. So, there are
more possible worlds propositions than there are distinct states of believing that
ϕ. Most propositions are in fact unbelievable. Likewise, most are undesirable,
and most we cannot have any uncertainty about, and so on. If we add now the
reasonable premise that if it’s possible for i to be aware of ϕ, then it’s possible
for i to believe (or desire, be uncertain about, etc.) that ϕ, then we get the
conclusion that there are propositions of which i cannot possibly be aware.13
There are two obvious ways to resist this conclusion. One would be to deny
that there are fewer functional roles than there are propositions. Lewis does
not say much to support this, only that he ‘cannot see the slightest prima facie
reason to think that there are even uncountably many of the definitive roles’
(pp. 106–7). The thought, perhaps, was this: for the typical functionalist of the
reductive physicalist variety, a definitive functional role for a given mental state
S is characterised in terms of causal relations between that state and some range
of possible sensory inputs, behavioural outputs, and other (physical, e.g., neu-
rological) states. Suppose therefore that there are only finitely many relevantly
distinct possible sensory inputs, behavioural outputs, and other neurological
states. This is plausible enough for beings like us; we have limited capacities for
making meaningful distinctions between sensory inputs, for example, and our
behavioural dispositions can only get so fine-grained. If so, then for each finite
n there would be no more than finitely many n-ary relevantly distinct relations
that hold between those inputs, outputs, and other states; and hence, no more
than countably many functional roles could be characterised in terms of those
relations (or continuum many if we allow also relations which take a countably
infinite number of arguments).
The problem, again, is that it’s not clear whether these finite limitations are
metaphysically essential to thinkers in general. As noted in (Chalmers (2011),
pp. 91–2) if there can be arbitrarily complex infinitary beings, then there’s no
13 Lewis conducts his discussion in terms of ‘thoughts’ and ‘thinking’ rather than ‘beliefs’,
‘desires’ and ‘uncertainties’, as I’ve done here. This won’t make any difference to my response,
but it will help to avoid some ambiguities.
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reason why there cannot be arbitrarily many functional roles. If there are k rele-
vantly distinct input, output, or neurological states, then there are (at least) 2k
n-ary relations between those states.14 And to reiterate the point made earlier,
it’s at least arguable that Iggy, or any other agent i, could have been such an in-
finitary being, capable of making arbitrarily fine-grained distinctions in percep-
tion or behaviour, or with an infinitely complex neurological state. Alternatively,
given a non-reductive functionalism—such as that found in Schwitzgebel’s dis-
positionalism for instance; see Schwitzgebel (2002)—we might allow definitive
functional relations to hold between a richer variety of phenomena. Schwitzgebel
himself characterises ‘beliefs’ partly in terms of their relationships with non-
reduced phenomenological properties, and (for all we know) there may well be
an arbitrarily large number of these.
A second way to resist Lewis’ conclusion would be to deny the implicit as-
sumption that for each ϕ such that an agent can believe (or desire, be uncertain
about, etc.) ϕ, there must be a separate functional role by which believing (or
desiring, or being uncertain about, etc.) ϕ is to be defined. There are multiple
ways you might go about this, but I’ll just discuss the one that I find the most
interesting. In particular, you might think that instead of each individual at-
titude receiving a separate definition, it’s entire or ‘holistic’ belief-plus-desire
states that are functionally defined.
Lewis himself seems to have held a view like this. Roughly, given a sequence
of perceptual or evidential inputs E and a suite of appropriately characterised
behavioural dispositions D, we are to assign to an agent (or an appropriate state
of the agent, most likely a brain state; see Lewis (1983), p. 373) the maximally
‘eligible’ set of credences and utilities that rationalises D given E; see Lewis
(1974), Lewis (1983). Lewis thought that, given any D and E pair, there will
always be multiple sets of credences and utilities that rationalise D given E.
Hence, he thought that there are more holistic credence-utility states than there
are definitive functional roles, and since only one or at most a relative few of
those will be maximally ‘eligible’, there will thus be some credence-utility states
which are never assigned at any possible world. I have argued elsewhere that this
was a mistake (see [anonymised]; cf. also Schwarz (2014)), but that’s neither here
nor there. Even supposing it’s true that there are, let’s imagine, only countably
many definitive functional roles with which to define the possible assignments of
holistic credence-utility states, it simply does not follow from this that there are
only countably many propositions to which an agent might have credences and/
or utilities. Similarly, imagine that there are only countably many pairs of sets
of beliefs and desires that can be functionally characterised—this is entirely
consistent with saying that there are an arbitrarily large number of distinct
propositions which might belong to one of those sets.
Again, there is more that could be said on each of the above points. Perhaps
there are brute necessities, for instance, and one of those brute necessities is
that i never happens to be aware of the proposition ϕ. I don’t see any way that
we could rule that out, short of settling once and for all the difficult matter
of whether there are any brute necessities tout court. Or perhaps there are
facts about transworld identity which preclude any human agent from possibly
being like a bat, or from having an infinitely complex brain. I am not convinced.
14 Assume, e.g., that there is at least one distinct binary relation on any set S for every non-
empty set of ordered pairs of members of S; then there are at least as many binary relations
on S as there are non-empty subsets of S × S.
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More importantly, it’s not obvious that there are any necessarily unentertainable
propositions. The easy route to finding counterexamples to AUR doesn’t seem
so easy after all.
6.3 Epistemic conceptions of coarse-grained content
So much for the metaphysical conception. Let’s now consider an alternative,
epistemic conception of coarse-grained content.15 Say that ϕ is epistemically
possible just in case it cannot be ruled out a priori. The thought that ϕ can
then be said to correspond to an epistemic possibility, a way the world might
be for all one might know a priori. Given this, let Ω designate the space of
maximally specific epistemic possibilities; i.e., for each ω and every ϕ, ω either
a priori entails ϕ or ¬ϕ, and ω entails both ϕ and ψ only if ϕ∧ψ is epistemically
possible. Then, ϕ and ψ are a priori equivalent just in case ϕ and ψ are entailed
by all the same ω. All logical truths and falsehoods will be a priori equivalent, as
will be, e.g., bachelors are bachelors and bachelors are unmarried available men.
And, most importantly, if two thoughts ϕ and ψ under two different modes of
presentation are metaphysically equivalent, yet the equivalence of those modes
of presentation is not a priori, then ϕ and ψ will correspond to distinct subsets
of Ω.
Most theorists who make use of the epistemic conception are pluralists about
content: they accept that the metaphysical conception is explanatorily useful
for many purposes, but also that it cannot play all of the explanatory roles for
which we might want a notion of content to play. (Though this is not true of
everyone; cf. Sandgren (2018).) The epistemic conception, in particular, seems
better equipped to account for the phenomenon of cognitive significance. That
H2O is H2O is trivial and easily discovered upon a priori reflection, but no
amount of reasoning absent empirical evidence will get us to water is H2O.
Where our task is to model the kind of information an agent has available to
her via reasoning from her explicit beliefs, the epistemic conception thus seems
particularly apt. But lest it be said that the epistemic conception does not
“really” give us a coarse-grained theory to content, let me note some points
before moving on.
First, one should not assume that the epistemic conception involves merely
supplementing the original space of metaphysically possible worlds with a num-
ber of metaphysically impossible worlds so as to let us distinguish between, e.g.,
those worlds where Hesperus is Hesperus and those where Hesperus is Phospho-
rus. For one thing, at least some metaphysical possibilities seem to be a priori
false. For instance, where ‘watery’ designates the property of being the clear,
potable liquid around here that fills the lakes and oceans and falls from the sky
as rain, then the thought that water is watery is arguably a priori, but it’s cer-
tainly not metaphysically necessary that H2O is watery. Or a less controversial
example: if something is watery, then the stuff that is actually watery is watery
is clearly a priori, but it is not metaphysically necessary. The epistemic con-
ception is not merely the metaphysical conception with a few extra impossible
worlds.
15 I include here only a bare-bones development of the epistemic conception. More detailed
developments can be found in Chalmers (2002), Chalmers (2006), Chalmers (2011), Jackson
(1998), Jackson (2009). I have defended the epistemic conception elsewhere; see [anonymised].
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Indeed, on so-called ‘one-spaceist’ views (see e.g., Jackson in Jackson (2009)
and Chalmers in (Chalmers 2006, p. 82)) the set of (centred) metaphysically
possible worlds and the set of maximally specific epistemic possibilities are one
and the same: every (centred) world can be thought of in one of two ways: as
an hypothesis about how the world might be for all one might know a priori,
or as an hypothesis about how it could have been given the way things actually
are. According to one-spaceism, then, there’s no sense in which the epistemic
conception is more (or less) fine-grained than the metaphysical conception—
contents on either conception are simply subsets of a single space of worlds, Ω,
so each posits a notion of content which is exactly as coarse-grained as that
which is posited by the other.
Supposing then that classical logic is a priori, if we adopt the epistemic
conception then we will end up with a model on which PROP, MP, and REP
are valid, but which also lets us draw some distinctions between contents un-
der different modes of presentation that are unavailable on the metaphysical
conception. For instance, on the epistemic conception, no pair from the earlier
list of modes of presentation for thinking that skirnobs are poisonous are a pri-
ori equivalent, so each will hold relative to a different subset of Ω. Moreover,
cases like Examples 2 and 3 fail to generate counterexamples to AUR, for the
proposition ψ that Iggy is supposed to be aware of in those cases is not a priori
equivalent to Aiϕ. To consider just the latter example, it is certainly not a priori
that Iggy is in brain state S if and only if Iggy is aware of the proposition that
Iggy is aware of the proposition that skirnobs are poisonous. Awareness is not
as cheap on the epistemic conception as it is on the metaphysical conception.
It should be clear that other purported counterexamples which rely on a pos-
teriori metaphysical identities or rigidified definite descriptions will fail on the
epistemic conception for similar reasons.16
There is a general reason for thinking that counterexamples won’t arise once
we’ve got a notion of content that cuts as fine as cognitive significance—for how
could Iggy entertain some content ψ that has the very same cognitive significance
as Iggy is awareness-related to ϕ, without having the conceptual resources to
represent Iggy, awareness, and ϕ? Supposing that ψ is epistemically contingent,
then AUR looks essentially right. Unlike >, there are only so many ways to
entertain the thought that Iggy is aware of ϕ under a mode of presentation
that’s a priori equivalent to Iggy is aware of ϕ, and it’s reasonable to expect
that they all go hand-in-hand with the capacity to entertain ϕ itself.
Furthermore, there’s a stronger case to be made on the epistemic conception
that there are no ϕ such that it’s a priori that Iggy is not aware of ϕ. Arguments
from cognitive limitations don’t seem to get any grip: for any limitations that
are supposedly essential Iggy qua human being, it is not a priori for Iggy that
he is subject to those limitations. For all he knows a priori, he could have been
a bat. (See also Chalmers (2011), §9, for a detailed discussion of whether there
are any a priori unentertainable propositions.)
16 The same points apply to cases that involve linguistic deference and social externalism,
though I have not discussed these. When a non-expert thinks to themselves, I have arthritis
in my thigh, their grasp of arthritis is distinct from the understanding of an expert. Roughly,
it is something like the disease the experts refer to when they say ‘arthritis’. What the non-
expert knows a priori when they know something “merely by being situated in a linguistic
community” is quite different than what the experts know. Cf. (Chalmers 2002, §9).
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Before we move on, let me consider one final case for the existence of a
proposition that’s a priori unentertainable:
Example 4. Iggy decides to let ‘Silly’ name that proposition ϕ
such that, from amongst those propositions of which he is unaware,
is expressible by the shortest English sentence. He thinks to himself:
I am not aware of Silly.
Assuming that Iggy’s designation succeeds—i.e., there is indeed a unique ϕ that
satisfies the description—then Iggy’s thought is certainly a priori. But we have
to be careful here. The case does not establish the existence of a proposition
ϕ such that it’s a priori for Iggy that he is not aware of ϕ, because it is not a
priori what proposition ‘Silly’ picks out (if in fact it picks out any proposition
at all). What Iggy knows a priori is that if ‘Silly’ picks out something, then
whatever proposition it picks out, he is not aware of that proposition. At one
epistemic possibility ω1, ‘Silly’ might designate ϕ1; at ω2, ϕ2. It’s not a priori
what proposition ‘Silly’ picks out, so there’s no specific ϕ that Iggy knows he’s
not aware of, and AUR is safe.
7. Critical Discussion: PLAb
Finally, let us consider PLAb. As with Section 6, I will discuss the plausibility
of this axiom from the perspective of one who has already accepted a coarse-
grained theory of content. There are two main cases: those where there are
counterexamples to AUR (e.g., if we’ve adopted a metaphysical conception),
and those where there are no counterexamples to AUR (e.g., if we’ve adopted
an epistemic conception).
7.1 Counterexamples from AUR to PLAb
I will here argue that any counterexamples to AUR can be expected to generate
a counterexamples to PLAb, at least inasmuch as X represents knowledge.
This should be unsurprising: the potential counterexamples to AUR that
were discussed in the previous section can quite clearly be tweaked to pro-
vide counterexamples to PLAb. Consider Example 2, and substitute ‘Iggy is not
aware of the proposition that. . . ’ for ‘Iggy does not know that. . . ’; everything else
about can be left unchanged. The case would be one in which Xiψ is true and
ψ ↔ ¬Xiϕ is necessarily true, which combined with ¬Aiϕ would constitute a
counterexample to PLAb. (The substitution of ‘aware of’ for ‘knows that’ should
make no difference to the plausibility of ¬Aiϕ in that example.) Similarly, if it
turns out that there is some ϕ of which a given agent i is necessarily unaware,
then ϕ is ipso facto also something that i necessarily cannot know or believe. In
that case, > ↔ ¬Xiϕ is necessary, leading to a counterexample against PLAb.
However, there are more general reasons to think that there are no coun-
terexamples to AUR that do not also generate counterexamples to PLAb, in
the presence of TX . Thus, at least where X represents knowledge, we should be
willing to reject AUR only if we’re willing to reject PLAb. (This point will not
be especially important for the rest of my discussion, so if you’re satisfied with
what’s been said already then you may wish to skip directly on to Section 7.2.)
First of all, I assume that if Xi¬Aiϕ∧¬Aiϕ can be true, then Xi¬Xiϕ∧¬Aiϕ
can also be true. If Iggy can know that Iggy isn’t aware of ϕ (despite not being
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aware of ϕ), then Iggy can know that Iggy doesn’t know that ϕ (despite not
being aware of ϕ). After all, the latter is an obvious consequence of the former,
and Iggy should be able to know any obvious consequences of what he knows
if he’s also aware of all the relevant propositions. And if being unaware of ϕ
doesn’t prevent him from being aware of ¬Aiϕ, then there’s no reason to think
that it should prevent him from being aware of ¬Xiϕ.
Second, note that we have a counterexample to AUR only if there is some
possible situation where Ai¬Aiϕ ∧ ¬Aiϕ; and a counterexample to PLAb only
if there is a situation where Xi¬Xiϕ ∧ ¬Aiϕ. So let ψ = ¬Aiϕ, and assume
that there does exist some counterexample to AUR while there are also no
counterexamples to PLAb. Obviously this requires that ψ be contingent, given
the points made above; likewise ϕ must also be contingent, else ¬Aiϕ would be
incompatible with Ai¬Aiϕ. In light of the assumption of the previous paragraph
and the fact that Xiψ already implies ψ, this would have to mean that Aiψ ∧ψ
somehow precludes the possibility of Xiψ—which would be very strange, since
if ψ is true and i is aware of ψ, then i should be able to know ψ. It would be one
thing if the truth of ψ for some reason precluded awareness of ψ, which would in
turn naturally rule out any knowledge of ψ; but if the truth of ψ is compatible
with awareness of ψ, then it should also be compatible with knowledge that ψ.
(Simply imagine a case where Aiψ ∧ ψ, and i has, let’s say, plenty of reliable
testimonial evidence that ψ.)
Furthermore, since ¬Aiψ already implies ¬Xiψ, the assumption that AUR
faces counterexamples while PLAb doesn’t would mean that ψ alone implies
¬Xiψ; so, Xiψ would have to be impossible tout court. By PLAb, ¬Aiψ implies
¬Xi¬Xiψ, so ¬Aiψ implies ¬Xi>; and by NAX , ¬Xi> implies ¬Ai>. Putting
these two points together, ¬Aiψ would imply ¬Ai>; and we already know that
Aiψ implies Ai>. Hence, Ai> ↔ Aiψ would be necessary. Yet ψ cannot be
impossible, by hypothesis; likewise, ψ cannot be necessary, since then Xi> would
be impossible and so would Aiψ, which again it isn’t by hypothesis. Thus, for
PLAb to avoid falling foul of the whatever counterexamples exist for AUR, we
would need that there are no propositions ϕ of which i is necessarily unaware,
and for each and every ϕ such that Ai¬Aiϕ ∧ ¬Aiϕ is possible, AiAiϕ↔ Ai>
is necessary.
In sum: for there to be counterexamples to AUR yet no counterexamples to
PLAb, there would need to be some pair of contingent propositions, ϕ and ψ,
such that (i) ψ is true just in case i is not aware of ϕ, (ii) i is aware of ψ whenever
i is aware of anything whatsoever, and (iii) i cannot know ψ even when ψ is true
and i is aware of it. I think we can safely assume that no such pair ϕ and ψ exists,
even setting aside the already very strange property (iii). For what reason do we
have to think that i’s being aware of anything at all would require being aware of
¬Aiϕ, for some contingent ϕ? The only somewhat plausible suggestion for what
ϕ could be in this case is Ai>, or (what amounts to the same thing given SYM
and CONA) ‘i is aware of something’. But I have argued already in Section 3.3
that i’s being aware of something or other doesn’t presuppose the capacity to
represent either i or awareness itself, so we don’t get Ai¬AiAi> as a consequence
for i’s being aware of anything at all out of some simple iterative principles like
AIA. And if I am right about that, then more generally we shouldn’t expect
awareness of any contingent proposition ¬Aiϕ to be a consequence of awareness
simpliciter—after all, any other way of entertaining that same proposition would
require some other suite of representational resources which i may well also lack.
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7.2 The implausibility of ‘Plausibility’
So the possible worlds theorist should reject PLAb, if they think that there are
in fact some counterexamples to AUR. However, I have also argued that, at least
on an epistemic conception of coarse-grained content, AUR is plausible. Con-
sequently, I will here argue that where X represents knowledge, if the possible
worlds theorist is willing to accept AUR, then they should reject PLAb—indeed,
in part because of the acceptance of AUR.
This might seem a little surprising. AUR and PLAb rest on more or less the
same intuition. So, just as you might expect that if there are any problems for
the former then there will be analogous problems for the latter, likewise you
might expect that if there are any problems for the latter then there will be
analogous problems for the former. And if we’ve decided that AUR is plausible
after all, then shouldn’t we do the same for PLAb?
The problem with this thought is that AUR and PLAb are not entirely
symmetrical in all relevant respects, once TX is factored into the equation. In
particular, AUR implies the existence, for each agent i, of a specific class of
propositions that i necessarily cannot know. Assume that there are no coun-
terexamples to AUR. Then, for any ϕ, suppose that i knows that i is not aware
of ϕ. Knowledge presupposes awareness, so i must be aware of i’s being unaware
of ϕ, and therefore he must be aware of ϕ. However, by veridicality, i cannot
be aware of ϕ. Contradiction. Consequently, if AUR is accepted, then there are
certain propositions that i cannot know—i.e., anything necessarily equivalent
to ¬Aiϕ—simply because the truth of those propositions is incompatible with
i’s knowledge thereof.
On the other hand, PLAb does not imply the existence of any propositions
of which i is necessarily unaware. And this is an important asymmetry. For
we have seen that AUR is plausible from the perspective of a coarse-grained
theory of content only if there are no propositions ϕ of which i is necessarily
unaware—simply because, if ¬Aiϕ is impossible, then i might come to be aware
of ¬Aiϕ in a myriad of ways without being aware of ϕ (or himself, or the
awareness relation). By the same token, PLAb is plausible from the perspective
of a coarse-grained theory of content only if there are no propositions that i
cannot possibly know—simply because, if Xiϕ is impossible, then i might come
to know ¬Xiϕ in a myriad of ways without being aware of ϕ (or himself, or the
awareness relation). Thus, on a coarse-grained theory of content, the acceptance
of AUR generates problems for PLAb, but not vice versa.
But we don’t need to go via AUR to find problems with PLAb. Given TX ,
there are plenty of other kinds of impossible knowledge states. Suppose we
introduced into the language ei, interpreted as ‘i exists’, and stipulate that it’s
true at a world ω just in case Ai(ω) is non-empty. (An agent who’s not aware
of anything whatsoever is not an agent at all, so the agent i exists only if i
is aware of something.) Now consider Xi¬Xi¬ei: does Ai¬ei follow? No: the
agent i might come to know > in any number of ways, and ipso facto come to
know ¬Xi¬ei, without necessarily being able to represent himself or his own
(in)existence. Or suppose that b is true just in case there are beliefs; then Xi¬b
is impossible, T ↔ ¬Xi¬b necessary, yet knowing > doesn’t imply being aware
of b: having beliefs does not require being able to think thoughts about the
existence of beliefs.
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8. In Defence of Classical Logic
The points made in Section 6 and Section 7 obviously hang on the prior ac-
ceptance of a coarse-grained theory of content in some form or another. I don’t
expect to have convinced anyone who thinks that the contents of thought cut
finer than necessary equivalence that they ought to reject AUR and/or PLAb. To
such a reader it will likely appear that I am seeing counterexamples to AUR and
PLAb where I really ought to be seeing counterexamples to the coarse-grained
theory of content. I’ve argued, for example, that since ¬Xi¬Aiϕ is necessary
and contents are coarse-grained, therefore i can know ¬Xi¬Aiϕ without being
aware of Aiϕ. But perhaps I should have argued instead that since i can’t know
and be aware of ¬Xi¬Aiϕ without being aware of Aiϕ, therefore contents are
not coarse-grained. (This was the essential point of Dekel et al.’s argument, after
all.)
But therein lies I think the most important lesson of the foregoing discus-
sion: to the extent that incorporating some representation of unawareness into
classical logics of belief and knowledge presents possible worlds theorists with
any problems at all, it doesn’t seem to add any specific issues over and above
the more general concerns about hyperintensionality of which we are all already
aware. For the possible worlds theorist, who has considered the arguments and
intuitions in favour of fine-grained contents and found them wanting, it’s not at
all troubling to be told that there’s something counterintuitive to saying that
i can know and be aware of ¬Xi¬Aiϕ even while unaware of Aiϕ, given that
Xi¬Aiϕ is impossible. This is precisely on a par with being told that one can
know p ∨ ¬p even while one is unaware of p—and no possible worlds theorist is
going to give up on their position because of that! Or consider again the axiom
DISA:
DISA. Ai(ϕ ∧ ψ)→ (Aiϕ ∧Aiψ)
There is no denying that DISA has prima facie plausibility. But that plausibility
stems entirely from the intuition that mental contents cut finer than necessary
equivalence—that to be aware of ϕ∧ψ is to be aware of some structured entity
which has ϕ and ψ as its essential parts. Any triviality argument against a
coarse-grained account of unawareness that’s based on DISA (like the one we
saw in Section 3.1) is by virtue of this no more compelling a reason to reject the
coarse-grained view than the already apparent strangeness of the claim that by
knowing p ∨ ¬p you therefore also automatically know ¬(q ∧ ¬q).
If there were something special about the phenomenon of unawareness itself
which rendered it incompatible with classical logic—something separable from
presuppositions about granularity—then that would be a major blow for the pos-
sible worlds theorist. But there is nothing new here, just an old problem dressed
up in new clothes. And, importantly, possible worlds theorists have a suite of
tools to help address the problems that arise from the apparent hyperintension-
ality of thought. Given a Two-Dimensionalist approach to mental content and an
appropriately characterised space of epistemically possible worlds, for example,
many of the classic problem cases for possible worlds semantics—e.g., the need to
distinguish between metaphysically equivalent but epistemically non-equivalent
water-beliefs and H2O-beliefs—can be dealt with very naturally without devi-
ating from the basic idea that propositional contents are sets of possible worlds.
And conversational pragmatics can help deal with linguistic intuitions about
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the substitutability of that-clauses within the context of propositional attitude
verbs even in cases of logical or a priori equivalence (see esp. Stalnaker (1978),
Stalnaker (1984)).17
The real concern for coarse-grained theories of content arises when they are
taken in conjunction with a plausible theory of action; viz., that agents will
typically act so as to maximise their desire or preference satisfaction given the
way they believe the world to be (cf. Stalnaker (1991)). If a theory of content has
empirically false behavioural implications then it must be rejected—and, prima
facie, the typical subject doesn’t seem to act as we might expect given beliefs
in every necessary truth unless we posit that they have very strange desires.
Thus the coarse-grained theorist has to tell us a story about why, for example,
a mathematician might spend her days trying to work out whether or not the
Riemann hypothesis is true. (She already knows the answer to that question;
she just doesn’t know whether the sentence ‘The Riemann zeta function has its
zeros only at the negative even integers and complex numbers with real part
1
2 ’ expresses the necessary truth—the task is to attribute some plausible set
of beliefs and desires that rationalises the time spent discovering yet another
complicated way to say >.)
For AUR and/or PLAb to generate empirical problems for the coarse-grained
theory along similar lines, we would need to have a case of an ordinary agent
i with presumably ordinary desires who, with respect to some ϕ such that it’s
impossible for i to be aware of ϕ (or such that i cannot know that she is unaware
of ϕ), tends to behave as if she doesn’t believe that she’s unaware of ϕ (or as
if she doesn’t believe that she doesn’t know she’s unaware of ϕ). But how does
the typical agent generally fail to act so as to suggest that she doesn’t have
the relevant beliefs? Examples are not easy to find, since (under REP) i will
also believe that > → ¬Aiϕ (or > → ¬Xi¬Aiϕ), which will tend to mute
any behavioural consequences that we might otherwise have expected would be
generated by those beliefs. For instance, perhaps i doesn’t like being unaware of
anything; hence, for i, ¬Aiϕ represents an undesirable state of affairs. But if she
knows that > → ¬Aiϕ, then she won’t try to do anything to improve her state of
awareness in this respect. More generally, according to the view of rational action
that is supposed to generate the problem, agents’ actions are a response to those
things they believe they can change so as improve their situation. So considered
in combination with a coarse-grained account of content, we shouldn’t expect a
belief in a necessary proposition to have interesting behavioural consequences:
agents who believe a necessary proposition also believe that it’s necessary, that
it will be a fact of the world regardless of what they choose. So it’s certainly
not obvious that there would be any behavioural consequences of saying that i
believes ¬Aiϕ, or ¬Xi¬Aiϕ, which aren’t in fact borne out by i’s behaviour.
It may turn out that there is really is no way to assign plausible coarse-
grained beliefs and desires so as to rationalise the actions of ordinary agents.
If so, we’ll need to either adopt a more fine-grained approach to content, or
revise our theory of action. I take this is still an open empirical question. The
success of standard models of decision-making—which generally make use of
17 ‘Fragmentation’ also helps deal with additional concerns relating to information access
and logical closure properties. However, these are much less pressing issues for classical logics
in general, which are only committed to closure under necessary equivalence. Similarly for
PWA models, where explicit beliefs are not closed under implication and implicit beliefs are
only closed under implication relative to awareness.
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coarse-grained content—provides a limited reason to think that the behavioural
data can be accommodated within a classical logic. Or, at the least, they pro-
vide reasons to continue modelling contents using sets of possible worlds. And
whatever issues such models may or may not have, they are independent of
considerations arising from unawareness.
9. Rational Belief with Non-Trivial Unawareness
Let’s take stock. Where X represents knowledge, XUIb is plausible but PLAb
isn’t. WhereX represents belief, XUIb is implausible, while PLAb seems about as
plausible as AUR is. Whether AUR is plausible is independent of how we inter-
pret X, but does seem to depend on (a) the particular theory of coarse-grained
content, and (b) whether there are any necessarily or a priori unentertainable
propositions. Thus, where X represents belief, the status of AUR and PLAb is
uncertain.
In this final section, I will prove that supplementing Σ with AUR and PLAb
is consistent with non-trivial awareness in the absence of XUIb. In fact, I’ll prove
something stronger than that—suppose we add the following three axioms to
Σ:
ARA. AiAjϕ→ Aiϕ
ARX . AiXjϕ→ Aiϕ
ARI . AiIjϕ→ Aiϕ
Given SYM, ARA implies AUR; and given SYM and PLAa, ARX gets us to
PLAb. The three in combination say that for all agents i and j, if i is aware of
j’s having some attitude (A, X, or I) regarding ϕ, then i must herself be aware
of ϕ. I take it that this is a natural generalisation of the shared intuition that
motivates both PLAb and AUR—so, if we can show that the combination of
ARA, ARX , and ARI is compatible with non-trivial awareness in the absence
of XUIb, then we’ll also have given strong reasons to believe that there are no
other triviality results in the vicinity of Dekel et al.’s that rest on the same
intuitions but don’t go through XUIb.
Let Σ† refer to the system Σ∪{ARA,ARX ,ARI}, and letM† refer to that
class of PWA models which satisfies the following additional constraints:
ara. If {ω′ : P ∈ Aj(ω′)} ∈ Ai(ω), then P ∈ Ai(ω)
arx. If {ω′ : P ∈ Xj(ω′)} ∈ Ai(ω), then P ∈ Ai(ω)
ari. If {ω′ : P ∈ Aj(ω′) and
⋂Xi(ω) ⊆ P} ∈ Ai(ω), then P ∈ Ai(ω)
The following is then easy to prove given the proof of Theorem 3.1:
Theorem 9.1 Σ† is sound and complete with respect toM† and LAXI(Φ).
Proof. See Appendix B.
We can now show that there are PWA models of (rational) believers be-
longing to M† which allow for non-trivial awareness. For the model Me =
(Ω,Xi,Ai, pi), let Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3}, and Φ = {p, q, r}. We will suppose that
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pi(p) = {ω1}, pi(q) = {ω2}, and pi(r) = {ω3}, and we let Iggy’s awareness and
belief functions be defined as follows:
Ai(ωn) =

{∅, {ω1}, {ω2, ω3},Ω}, if n = 1
{∅,Ω}, if n = 2
2Ω, if n = 3
Xi(ωn) =

{{ω2, ω3},Ω}, if n = 1
{Ω}, if n = 2
{Ω}, if n = 3
The world of interest is ω1, where Iggy’s awareness is non-trivial: he is able to
draw a distinction between p-worlds and ¬p-worlds, but he is unable to draw a
distinction between q-worlds and r-worlds.
From the model Me, Theorem 9.2 follows:
Theorem 9.2 For all ϕ,ψ,M† 6|= ¬Aiϕ→ ¬Xi> andM† 6|= ¬Aiψ → ¬Aiϕ.
Proof. The model obviously satisfies pla, sym, con, and nax. That Me satisfies
ara can be seen by noting first of all that:
{ω : P ∈ Ai(ω)} =

Ω, if P ∈ {∅,Ω}
{ω1, ω3}, if P ∈ {{ω1}, {ω2, ω3}}
{ω3}, otherwise
So there are exactly three propositions P (i.e., Ω, {ω1, ω3}, {ω3}) such that for
some ϕ, P = ‖Aiϕ‖Me . In all three cases it’s easy to check that if Ω, {ω1, ω3} or
{ω3} belongs to Ai(ω), then the required proposition P also belongs to Ai(ω).
Similarly for arx:
{ω′ : P ∈ Xi(ω)} =
{
Ω, if P = Ω
{ω1}, if P = {ω2, ω3}
So there are exactly two propositions P (i.e., Ω, {ω1}) such that for some ϕ,
P = ‖Xiϕ‖Me . {ω1} is in Ai(ω) whenever {ω2, ω3} is, and Ω always belongs to
Ai(ω). Finally, ari is equivalent in this case to arx, since Xi(ω) is already closed
under supersets of
⋂Xi(ω).
Furthermore, at every world in the model, Iggy is rational in at least the
sense that his beliefs satisfy:
KX . (Xi(ϕ→ ψ) ∧Xiϕ)→ Xiψ
D. Xiϕ→ ¬Xi¬ϕ
N. Xi>
KX is stronger than we need to call Iggy rational, of course, but its satisfaction
straightforwardly implies the more generally plausible rationality axioms:
KAX . (Xi(ϕ→ ψ) ∧Xiϕ)→ (Aiψ → Xiψ)
CONX . (Xiϕ ∧Xiψ)→ Xi(ϕ ∧ ψ)
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Together these mean that there’s no difference between Iggy’s implicit and ex-
plicit beliefs—Iggy has drawn every classical logical consequence that can be
drawn from what he believes given everything of which he is aware.
Thus, letM†† designate the restriction ofM† models to those where the
Xi satisfy the following constraints (for all i, ω, P1, P2):
kax. If P1 ∈ Xi(ω) and P1 ⊆ P2, then P2 ∈ Xi(ω) if P2 ∈ Ai(ω)
conx.
⋂Xi(ω) ∈ Xi(ω)
d. If P ∈ Xi(ω), then Ω \ P /∈ Xi(ω)
n. Ω ∈ Xi(ω)
Then the model also obviously establishes:
Corollary 4 For all ϕ,ψ,M†† 6|= ¬Aiϕ→ ¬Xi> andM†† 6|= ¬Aiψ → ¬Aiϕ.
That is, even under the strengthened awareness conditions (arx, ara and
ari) which generalise PLAb and AUR, plus basic rationality conditions (kax,
conx, d and n), there are going to PWA models which can accommodate the
possibility of non-trivial unawareness, in the sense that:
1. An agent can be unaware of ϕ and still believe >.
2. An agent can be unaware of ϕ without being unaware of everything.
Consequently, where the goal is just to develop a logic of non-veridical belief
with unawareness, the possible worlds theorist has at least one sure way out
of Dekel et al.’s triviality result—and they can rest easy that there will be no
further triviality results in the nearby vicinity, either.
10. Conclusion
The very large majority of epistemic or doxastic logics that have been developed
over the past two decades which feature an awareness operator in some form
or another have been non-classical. All of these logics are incompatible with a
coarse-grained approach to content. This sets much the work on unawareness
somewhat at odds with research elsewhere in formal epistemology, where coarse-
grained models of propositional content are still very much standard—and for
good reason. Moreover, the present state of affairs leaves the possible worlds
theorist without an appropriate way to understand the impact that unawareness
has on belief and informational content.
I have shown that it’s possible to retain PLA and AUR—widely considered to
be of special importance to any model of unawareness—within a coarse-grained
content model of belief with unawareness, and indeed we can include stronger
axioms that generalise the intuitions behind PLA and AUR without introducing
triviality. We can do this as long as we give up XUI, which I’ve argued we
should do regardless of how fine-grained we take mental content to be. There
are no formal reasons arising from PLA and AUR for not adopting a model
that makes use of coarse-grained, sets-of-possible-worlds contents. Whether we
ought to keep both of those axioms, on the other hand, is a trickier matter.
I have also argued that when it comes to modelling knowledge, the argu-
ments in favour of PLA add nothing over and above already existing arguments
against coarse-grained contents. Theorem 4.1 and its corollaries give us no rea-
son to think that a classical logic with unawareness is any worse off than the
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classical logic of belief was already with respect to the puzzles associated with
hyperintensionality. There is a rich body of philosophical work dealing with
exactly these puzzles within the framework of traditional possible worlds se-
mantics, and all the reason in the world to think that the very same work can
be marshalled in support of a possible worlds model of awareness.
Appendix A
The soundness part of Theorem 3.1 is straightforward by induction and left to
the reader. To prove completeness we will construct a canonical PWA model.
For any ϕ ∈ LAXI(Φ), say that ϕ is consistent (relative to the system Σ)
iff it’s not the case that `Σ ¬ϕ; a finite set Γ = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} is consistent iff
ϕ1∧· · ·∧ϕn is consistent; and an arbitrary set Γ = {ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . } is consistent iff
every finite subset of Γ is consistent. Finally, say that Γ is a maximal consistent
set (i.e., MaxΓ) just in case Γ is consistent and maximal, in the sense that any
strict superset of Γ is inconsistent.
On the ordinary way of constructing canonical models, the set of ‘worlds’ is
just the set of all maximal consistent sets of formulas. For the present proof, how-
ever, it will be easier to include two ‘worlds’ for every maximally consistent set
Γ. In this, I am applying a modified version of a strategy from Fagin and Halpern
Fagin and Halpern (1988). For the sequel, then, let Ω0 = {Γn : MaxΓ, n = 0},
and Ω1 = {Γn : MaxΓ, n = 1}, with Ωc = Ω0 ∪Ω1. We will also make frequent
use of the following abbreviations. We use ‘|ϕ|’ to refer to the proof set of ϕ in
Ωc; i.e., the set of all Γn ∈ Ωc such that ϕ ∈ Γn. We use ‘B(X)’ to refer to the
closure of X under complements and binary intersections. And finally, for all i
and Γn,
Γn\Ai = {ϕ : Aiϕ ∈ Γn}
P ?α,Γn = {∆1 ∈ Ωc : Γn\Ii ⊆ ∆1}
‘Γn\Xi’ and ‘Γn\Ii’ are defined in a similar fashion.
We can now define the canonical PWA model, M c:
Definition 10.1 M c = (Ωc, {X ci }i∈Ag, {Aci}i∈Ag, pic), where:
1. Ωc = Ω0 ∪ Ω1
2. X ci (Γn) =

∅, if Γn\Ai = ∅
{|ϕ| : Xiϕ ∈ Γn} ∪ {Ω1,Ω0}, if Γn\Ai 6= P ?α,Γn = ∅
{|ϕ| : Xiϕ ∈ Γn} ∪ {P ?α,Γn}, if P ?α,Γn 6= ∅
3. Aci (Γn) =
{
∅, if Γn\Ai = ∅
B({|ϕ| : Aiϕ ∈ Γn} ∪ 2Ω1), if Γn\Ai 6= ∅
4. pic(p) = |p|
We will also need a few basic lemmas.
Lemma 10.1 For all ϕ,ψ ∈ LAXI(Φ),
1. |¬ϕ| = Ωc \ |ϕ|
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2. |ϕ ∧ ψ| = |ϕ| ∩ |ψ|
3. |>| = Ωc
Proof. The proof is no different than for standard canonical models where Ωc =
{Γ : MaxΓ}, and therefore omitted.
Lemma 10.2 B({|ϕ| : Aiϕ ∈ Γn}) = {|ϕ| : Aiϕ ∈ Γn}
Proof. That {|ϕ| : Aiϕ ∈ Γn} is closed under complementation: Suppose that
P ∈ {|ϕ| : Aiϕ ∈ Γn}. So, P = |ϕ|, for some formula ϕ such that Aiϕ ∈ Γn. By
SYM, it follows that Ai¬ϕ ∈ Γn. Hence, |¬ϕ| ∈ {|ϕ| : Aiϕ ∈ Γn}, and by Lemma
10.1, |¬ϕ| = Ωc \ |ϕ|. That {|ϕ| : Aiϕ ∈ Γn} is closed under binary intersections
follows a basically similar structure, using CONA and Lemma 10.1.
Lemma 10.3 |ϕ| ∈ B({|ϕ| : Aiϕ ∈ Γn} ∪ 2Ω1) just in case |ϕ| ∈ {|ϕ| : Aiϕ ∈
Γn}, whenever Γn\Ai 6= ∅
Proof. The right-to-left direction is trivial. To establish the left-to-right direc-
tion, we suppose throughout that Γn\Ai 6= ∅, and hence {|ϕ| : Aϕ ∈ Γn} 6= ∅.
We first show that if a proposition P belongs to B({|ϕ| : Aiϕ ∈ Γn} ∪ 2Ω1),
then P satisfies at least one of the following three conditions:
c1 P ∈ {|ϕ| : Aiϕ ∈ Γn}
c2 P ⊆ Ω1
c3 P ∩ Ω0 = P ′ ∩ Ω0, for some P ′ ∈ {|ϕ| : Aiϕ ∈ Γn}
It’s trivial that if P ∈ {|ϕ| : Aiϕ ∈ Γn} ∪ 2Ω1 , then P satisfies c1 or c2. So we
only need to show that closing {|ϕ| : Aiϕ ∈ Γn} ∪ 2Ω1 under complements and
binary intersections will not leave us with any P which don’t satisfy (at least)
one of c1, c2, or c3. We’ll proceed in two steps.
For the first step, note that:
(a) If P satisfies c1, then Ωc \ P satisfies c1
(b) If P satisfies c2 or c3, then Ωc \ P satisfies c3
(a) follows immediately from Lemma 10.2. For (b), note first that if P satisfies
c2, then P ∩ Ω0 = ∅, which belongs to {|ϕ| : Aiϕ ∈ Γn} and therefore satisfies
c3 trivially. Furthermore, supposing that P satisfies c3, P includes exactly those
states of Ω0 which belong to some |ϕ|. So, (Ωc \ P ) ∩ Ω0 includes just those
states of Ω0 which aren’t included in P , which are exactly those in |¬ϕ| ∩ Ω0.
Next,
(c) If {ω1} satisfies c2, then {ω1} ∩ P2 satisfies c2 (for any P2)
(d) If {ω1} and P2 both satisfy c1, then {ω1} ∩ P2 satisfies c1
(e) If {ω1} and c2 both satisfy c3, then {ω1} ∩ P2 satisfies c3
(f) If {ω1} satisfies c1, and P2 satisfies c3, then {ω1} ∩ P2 satisfies c3
(c) is obvious, and (d) is an immediate consequence of Lemma 10.2. Similarly,
(e) and (f) follow more or less directly from Lemma 10.2, which entails that if
P , P ′ ∈ {|ϕ| : Aiϕ ∈ Γn}, then P ∩ P ′ ∩ Ω0 = P ′′ ∩ Ω0, for some P ′′ ∈ {|ϕ| :
Aiϕ ∈ Γn}.
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Given facts (a) through (f) plus the fact that every P ∈ {|ϕ| : Aiϕ ∈ Γn}∪2Ω1
satisfies either c1 or c2, we know that for any P ∈ B({|ϕ| : Aiϕ ∈ Γn} ∪ 2Ω1),
P satisfies c1, c2, or c3.
So now let P refer to the set of all proof sets. We now prove that if P ∈
B({|ϕ| : Aiϕ ∈ Γn} ∪ 2Ω1) then P ∈ P only if P ∈ {|ϕ| : Aiϕ ∈ Γn}, which gets
us to the left-to-right direction of the present lemma. By definition, if P satisfies
c1, then it belongs to {|ϕ| : Aiϕ ∈ Γn}. Likewise, if P satisfies c2, then P ∈ P
only if P = ∅, in which case it also belongs to {|ϕ| : Aiϕ ∈ Γn}. And finally, if
P satisfies c3, then P ∈ P only if P ∈ {|ϕ| : Aiϕ ∈ Γn}. For c3 implies that P ,
whatever it is, contains exactly those states of Ω0 which are also contained in
some P ′ ∈ {|ϕ| : Aiϕ ∈ Γn}. Suppose then that P ∈ P . Then, Γ1 ∈ P iff Γ0 ∈ P ,
from which it follows that P = P ′ for some P ′ ∈ {|ϕ| : Aiϕ ∈ Γn}.
With that out of the way, we first want to show that the canonical model
so-characterised actually belongs to the class of PWA models,M:
Lemma 10.4 M c ∈M
Proof. That Aci and X ci satisfy pla: For the case when Aci = ∅, X ci = ∅ by
definition. For the cases where Aci is non-empty, note that when P ?α,Γn = ∅, then
Ω1 and Ω0 are in both X ci (Γn) andAci (Γn); and when P ?α,Γn 6= ∅, P ?α,Γn ∈ X ci (Γn)
and (trivially) P ?α,Γn ∈ Aci (Γn). So, it suffices to show that
{|ϕ| : Xiϕ ∈ Γn} ⊆ {|ϕ| : Aiϕ ∈ Γn}
This follows from XI and IA. For suppose that Bϕ ∈ Γn. Then `Σ Xiϕ →
(Iiϕ → Aiϕ). So Aiϕ is derivable from Xiϕ in Σ, hence Aiϕ ∈ Γn. Hence,
|ϕ| ∈ {|ϕ| : Xiϕ ∈ Γn} only if |ϕ| ∈ {|ϕ| : Aiϕ ∈ Γn}.
That Aci satisfies sym and con is true by construction; that Aci and X ci satisfy
nax is straightforward and left to the reader.
The next step is to establish a truth lemma:
Lemma 10.5 M c,Γn |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ Γn
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the complexity of the formula ϕ.
For the cases where ϕ = p, ϕ = ¬ψ, and ϕ = ψ ∧ γ, the argument is standard.
Hence we will only focus on the following three cases:
(a) ϕ = Xiψ
(b) ϕ = Aiψ
(c) ϕ = Iiψ
For case (a): Under the inductive hypothesis, ‖ψ‖Mc = |ψ|, so ‖ψ‖Mc ∈ X ci (Γn)
iff |ψ| ∈ X ci (Γn). Suppose that M c,Γn |= Xiψ. By Definition 3.2, it follows that
‖ψ‖Mc = |ψ| ∈ X ci (Γn). As before, let P refer to the set of all proof sets. Ω0 /∈ P
and P ?α,Γn ∈ P only if P ?α,Γn = ∅ (since ∅ ⊆ P ?α,Γn ⊆ Ω1). So by Definition 10.1,
if |ψ| ∈ X ci (Γn), then |ψ| ∈ {|ϕ| : Xiϕ ∈ Γn}, and so Xiψ ∈ Γn. In the other
direction, if Xiψ ∈ Γn, then |ψ| = ‖ψ‖Mc ∈ X ci (Γn), so M c,Γn |= Xiψ.
For case (b): Given Lemma 10.3, the argument that M c,Γn |= Aiψ iff Aiψ ∈
Γn is exactly parallel to case (a).
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For case (c): Note first that P ?α,Γn ⊆ |ϕ| for any |ϕ| ∈ {|ϕ| : Xiϕ ∈ Γn}.
(Recall that P ?α,Γn = {∆1 : Γn\Ii ⊆ ∆1}, and by XI, Γn \Xi ⊆ Γn\Ii.) Given
this and Definition 10.1, ⋂
X ci (Γn) = P ?α,Γn
Given this and Definition 3.2, M c,Γn |= Iiψ iff Γn ∈ ‖Aiψ‖Mc and P ?α,Γn ⊆
‖ψ‖Mc . So suppose that Iiψ ∈ Γn. Given IA, we know then that Aiψ ∈ Γn;
so Γn ∈ |Aiψ|, and by the inductive hypothesis, Γn ∈ ‖Aiψ‖Mc . Furthermore,
we know that ψ ∈ ∆1 for every ∆1 ∈ P ?α,Γn , so P ?α,Γn ⊆ |ψ| = ‖ψ‖M
c , and
P ?α,Γn ⊆ ‖ψ‖M
c . Hence, if Iiψ ∈ Γn, then M c,Γn |= Iiψ.
For the other direction, suppose that M c,Γn |= Iiψ. By the points just
established, it follows that P ?α,Γn ⊆ ‖ψ‖M
c , and given the inductive hypothesis,
P ?α,Γn ⊆ |ψ|. From this it follows that the set Γn\Ii ∪ ¬ψ is inconsistent. For,
suppose that Γn\Ii∪¬ψ ⊆ Λ, for some maximal consistent set Λ. It would follow
that M c,Λ1 |= ¬ψ, so by Lemma 10.1, Λ1 /∈ |ψ|. However this cannot be, since
Λ1 ∈ P+α,Γn ⊆ |ψ|.
Since Γn\Ii ∪¬ψ is inconsistent, some finite set {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn,¬ψ} ⊆ Γn\Ii ∪
¬ψ is inconsistent. Thus:
`Σ ϕ1 → (. . . (ϕn → ψ) . . . )
Given NAX and XI, we have Ii(ϕ1 → (. . . (ϕn → ψ) . . . )) ∈ Γn whenever
Ai(ϕ1 → (. . . (ϕn → ψ) . . . )) ∈ Γn.
Next, note that since ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ Γn\Ii, we also get that Iiϕ1, . . . , Iiϕn are
in Γn. Under IA, it follows that Aiϕ1, . . . , Aiϕn are also in Γn. Furthermore, note
that by Definition 3.2, Γn ∈ ‖Aiψ‖Mc , which given the earlier points means that
Aiψ ∈ Γn. Finally, for any pair of formulas ϕ and γ, if Aiϕ ∈ Γn and Aiγ ∈ Γn,
then by applications of SYM and CONA, Ai¬(ϕ ∧ ¬γ) ∈ Γn. Since we can also
show that awareness is closed under logical equivalence, so Ai(ϕ → γ) ∈ Γn.












. . . (ϕn → ψ) . . .
))
Now, by finitely many applications of KAI , we can derive that Iiψ ∈ Γn.
Hence, if M c,Γn |= Iiψ, then Iiψ ∈ Γn.
We can then apply a standard argument to get from Definition 10.1, Lemma
10.4 and Lemma 10.5 to establish Theorem 3.1. See (Chellas 1980, pp. 59ff) for
details.
Appendix B
For Theorem 9.1, I’ll just sketch a proof that Σ ∪ {ARX} is complete for the
class of PWA models which satisfy arx; the full proof proceeds along the same
lines for the ara and ari. We keep the characterisation of the canonical models
M c as given in Definition 10.1, with the obvious modification that Ωc is now
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composed of maximal consistent sets relative to Σ ∪ {ARX}. The proof is then
the same as for Theorem 3.1, with the following addition to Lemma 10.4:
That M c satisfies arx: Let Q = {∆i : P ∈ X cj (∆i)}. We need to show that
if Q ∈ Aci (Γn), then P ∈ Aci (Γn). Assume that Q ∈ Aci (Γn). Now, either P /∈ P ,
or P ∈ P . If the former, then by Definition 10.1, either P ⊆ Ω1 or P = Ω0; in
either case, P ∈ Aci (Γn), so arx is straightforwardly satisfied whenever P /∈ P .
Suppose then that P ∈ P . Since Definition 10.1 implies in general that
X cj (∆1) = X cj (∆0), so ∆1 ∈ Q iff ∆0 ∈ Q. By points already established (Lemma
10.3), then, Q ∈ Aci (Γn) only if Q ∈ {|ϕ| : Aiϕ ∈ Γn}; so Q = |ϕ| for some ϕ
such that Aiϕ ∈ Γn. Furthermore, since by hypothesis P /∈ (2Ω1 \ {∅}) ∪ {Ω0},
P will be in X cj (∆i) if and only if P = |ψ| for some ψ such that Xjψ ∈ ∆i.
So Q = |Xjψ|, for some ψ. Putting these two facts together, we know that
AiXjψ ∈ Γn; and by ARX , Aiψ ∈ Γn; so |ψ| ∈ {|ϕ| : Aiϕ ∈ Γn}, which is of
course a subset of Aci (Γn).
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